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THE LAST PRISONERS OF WAR: RETURNING WORLD
WAR II ART TO ITS RIGHTFUL OWNERS-CAN
MORAL OBLIGATIONS BE TRANSLATED
INTO LEGAL DUTIES?
INTRODUCTION
"We will from now on, lead an unrelenting war of purification, an
unrelenting war of extermination, against the last elements which
have displaced our Art."'
Throughout World War II, Adolph Hitler and the Nazi troops
looted and confiscated thousands of works of art2 as part of a massive
art theft program designed to transform Hitler's Reich government
into the cultural capital of the Western World.3 By the time Paris was
liberated from the Nazi troops in 1944, it is estimated that between
one-fourth and one-third of all the art in Europe had been pillaged.4
Although the Allied forces worked to locate and return these and
other assets to their original prewar owners, 5 thousands of works of
art were integrated into the international art market where they soon
disappeared. 6 Today, tens of thousands of works of art are still miss-
ing, but many of the clues as to the current whereabouts of these
works lead straight to American museums, auction houses, art dealers,
and individual private collectors. 7 Now, current possessors of valua-
ble artwork, many of whom purchased or acquired the works in good
faith, are faced with a moral dilemma-should the works be returned
to their true, prewar owners or should good faith purchases and acqui-
sitions be protected? Does society have a moral obligation to Holo-
caust survivors, and if so, can that moral obligation be transformed
1. Stephanie Cuba, Stop the Clock: The Case to Suspend the Statute of Limitations on Claims
for Nazi-Looted Art, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 447, 471 (1999) (quoting LYNN H.
NICHOLAS, THE RAPE OF EUROPE, 20 (1995) (quoting and translating P.O. RAVE, KUNS
DUNSTDIKTATUR IM DRirIEN REICH, 55-56 (1949))).
2. HECTOR FELICIANO, THE LOST MUSEUM: THE NAZI CONSPIRACY TO STEAL THE WORLD'S
GREATEST WORKS OF ART 3 (1997).
3. Matthew Lippman, Art and Ideology in the Third Reich: The Protection of Cultural Property
and the Humanitarian Law of War, 17 DICK. J. INT'L L. 1, 96 (1998).
4. Id. at 4. See also James Rosen & Tom Hamburger, Looted Treasures: Museums Confront
the History Behind the Canvas, STAR TRIB., Nov. 9, 1999, at 2, available at 1999 WL 7517159.
5. See infra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
6. See infra note 58 and accompanying text.
7. See FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 4.
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into an affirmative legal duty? These are some of the questions cur-
rently facing the American legal system.
This Comment will consider whether moral obligations can be
translated into affirmative legal duties to reinforce the efforts to re-
turn art looted during World War II to its true owners. Part II briefly
surveys the history surrounding today's claims to World War II looted
art8 and traces the development of case law that addresses the quest to
restore looted and stolen art to its true owners. 9 Section III examines
and analyzes the legal doctrines that courts have applied in cases in-
volving looted and stolen art and notes the trends, problems, and
shortcomings in the courts' reasoning. 10 Finally, Section IV looks at
the effect that the existing case law has had on art owners, be they
institutions or individuals, and considers how the law should develop
in the future. Specifically, this section will consider whether federal
legislation is necessary to better ensure that looted art is returned to
its rightful owners." However, in order to reach solutions to the
problems of World War II looted art, it is important to begin by look-
ing at wartime Europe as the backdrop for current claims regarding
the return of such art.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to discuss how to resolve claims for the recovery of World
War II looted art, it is necessary to first examine the history and cir-
cumstances surrounding the claims for the return of missing works of
art, as well as case law that addresses the issue of stolen art in general.
A. History of Art in World War II
On January 30, 1933, Adolph Hitler was sworn in as Chancellor of
Germany. 12 The following year, on August 2, 1934, just hours after
the death of President von Hindenberg, Hitler assumed the posts of
8. See infra notes 12-63 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 64-271 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 272-351 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 352-426 and accompanying text.
12. See Lippman, supra note 3, at 5. Hitler was sworn in as Chancellor by the "increasingly
senile" President Paul von Hindenberg. Id. Because he lacked majority support in parliament,
Hitler persuaded von Hindenberg to call for new elections. Id. Then, when the Reichstag
burned (historical evidence indicates it was set fire by the National Socialist Party, or Nazi activ-
ists) on February 27, 1933, Hitler seized the opportunity to consolidate his control. Id. Nazi
officials warned of a Bolshevik uprising, and the following day, Hitler convinced von
Hindenberg to adopt defensive measures against the Communist Party. Id. By March 1933,
Hitler had managed to attract enough votes in parliament to pass the Enabling Act, which au-
thorized the Reich government to disregard the constitution and turn plenary power over to
Hitler. Id. at 6. In May 1933, the Reich government declared that their National Socialist Party,
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both Chancellor and President. 13 On the same day, it was announced
that henceforth Hitler would be referred to as Fiihrer and Reich
Chancellor. 14 Despite his political successes, however, Hitler consid-
ered himself to be a true artist. 15 Twice rejected from the School of
Fine Arts in Vienna and once rejected from the Vienna School of Ar-
chitecture, 16 Hitler dreamed of seizing and consolidating Europe's
most prized works of art in order to establish Germany as the cultural
capital of the Western World.' 7
"Inherent in Hitler's dreams of a pure Germanic race was a vision
of pure Germanic art. His two-fold plan involved ridding his empire
of 'degenerate art' and amassing a vast collection of pure Germanic
art . . ."18 "Degenerate art" was unacceptable art and included mod-
ern or abstract works, art by Jewish artists or depicting Jewish sub-
jects, and anything that was critical of Germany or did not depict
Germany as the Nazis perceived it.' 9 For the most part, "degenerate
art" was associated with the Jews and was considered inferior because
the human form was often unfinished or exaggerated. 20 Hitler warned
that German culture "was on the verge of being irrevocably contami-
nated ... by the Jewish-Bolshevik disease."' 2' Hitler believed that
[t]he triumph of the modern artistic sensibility had led to a loosen-
ing of morals which, in turn, had resulted in rampant crime, sexual
licentiousness, prostitution, the proliferation of inter-racial sexual
relations and to the spread of venereal disease and crime. It was
led by Hitler, was Germany's sole political party and that the formation of other parties was
prohibited. See Lippman, supra note 3, at 6.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Hector Feliciano, The Aftermath of Nazi Art Looting in the United States and Europe: The
Quest to Recover Stolen Collections, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 1, 2 (1999).
16. Id.
17. Lippman, supra note 3, at 1-2. Hitler aspired to rewrite art history "in order to highlight
Aryan supremacy." Id. at 96. He believed that the future of the human race depended on the
creative abilities of the Aryans. Id. at 4.
18. Kelly Ann Falconer, Comment, When Honor Will Not Suffice: The Need for a Legally
Binding International Agreement Regarding Ownership of Nazi-Looted Art, 21 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 383, 394 (2000). Hitler aimed to rid the world not only of degenerate artworks, but
also the artists who had created the works. Id.
19. Kelly Diane Walton, Leave No Stone Unturned: The Search for Art Stolen By the Nazis
and the Legal Rules Governing Restitution of Stolen Art, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 549, 555 (1999).
20. Id.
21. Lippman, supra note 3, at 3. "The Nazis viewed modern art as a Jewish invention which
was designed to ensure Semitic domination over contemporary culture." Id. at 27. In fact,
Hitler's concerns were more than just aesthetic; he "attributed the collapse of German society to
... cultural corrosion." Id. at 4.
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imperative to cleanse art . . . and to place art in the 'service of a
moral, political and cultural idea.' 22
For these reasons, in 1937, Hitler ordered German museums to rid
their collections of "degenerate art.' '23 The Nazis then sponsored "de-
generate art" shows throughout Germany in order to stress the need
for racial and cultural purity.24 Following the shows, the "degenerate
art" was traded, sold, or destroyed.25 The Nazis traded what they con-
sidered to be "degenerate art" for any type of German or Germanic
art, even if the German artworks were in bad condition or
anonymous.26
Beginning in 1938, Hitler and the Nazis began confiscating private
art collections, "in part for propagandistic reasons, in part for reasons
related to Hitler's extreme dislike for anything of cultural significance
to be owned by Jews or other 'inferior' races .... ",27 Nazi officials28
organized military groups and empowered government branches with
staffs of art historians and other scholars to assist with the looting
campaign. 2 9
22. Id. at 4 (quoting ADOLPH HITLER, MEIN KAMPF 255 (Ralph Manheim trans., 1971)
(1924)).
23. Michelle I. Turner, Note, The Innocent Buyer of Art Looted During World War II, 32
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1511, 1515 (1999). In fact, Hitler's propagandistic speeches addressing
the purification of German culture were themselves "prophetic of his plans to exterminate peo-
ple along with their art .... See Cuba, supra note 1, at 471.
24. Turner, supra note 23, at 1515. As one author noted, "[A]rtists and their works were
deemed to be degenerate for various reasons .... [However] [t]he criteria was so complex that
even Nazi officials were confused at times." Lippman, supra note 3, at 26.
25. Turner, supra note 23, at 1515, 1517. Following the final auction of degenerate art in
March 1939, most of the remaining works were burned. Id. at 1515.
26. Feliciano, supra note 15, at 3. While German museums and collectors were compensated
in this way, Jews and other enemies of the state were not compensated at all. Walton, supra note
19, at 556.
27. Walton, supra note 19, at 554. The Nazis confiscated private Jewish art collections via
statutes such as: the Ordinance for the Registration of Jewish Property, the Ordinance for the
Attachment of the Property of the People's and State's Enemies, and the Ordinance for the
Employment of Jewish Property. Cuba, supra note 1, at 471-72. As one author noted,
Hitler and other top level Nazis considered themselves cultured art admirers and col-
lectors, and art became one way in which the Nazis defined themselves. Being associ-
ated with great works of art became another characteristic defining the Aryan
conception of moral, intellectual and genetic superiority, and looted artworks were con-
sidered trophies.
Walton, supra note 19, at 553.
28. Hitler was aided, and even rivaled, in his efforts to transform culture by three top party
officials: Joseph Goebbels, Bernhard Rust, and Alfred Rosenberg. Walton, supra note 19, at
553-554.
29. Cuba, supra note 1, at 472. Despite the involvement of other top Nazi officials and the
creation of groups for the purpose of collecting and organizing the looted art, "Hitler was so
obsessed with the stolen art programs that he alone determined the fate of almost every piece of
art .... Walton, supra note 19, at 554-555.
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The countries of Western Europe were "viewed as components of
the Greater Reich and their artistic collections were considered to be
under German control." 30 Consequently, Hitler's "looting comman-
dos" swept through the nations of France, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Austria, and Germany, 31 systematically seizing works of art and other
property that belonged to the Jews. 32 As one author noted, "[B]y the
tragically ironic logic of the Nazis, the confiscation of Jewish collec-
tions was the natural extension of their policy of racial annihilation. '33
In Eastern Europe, however, the pattern was different. 34 In the
Slavic nations of Eastern Europe, the Nazis' goal was to strip these
countries of their cultural heritage.35 Because the Germans consid-
ered the Slavs to be an inferior race, the Nazi troops looted and pil-
laged private homes, as well as state museums and churches. 36
The Nazis justified the art looting campaign by pointing to the Ger-
man treasures stolen during the Napoleonic Wars and World War 1.37
Indeed, "the Nazis were far from ashamed of what they were doing.
To the Nazis, looting artwork was not stealing, rather artwork was or-
dinary bounty due the victors of war."' 38 It should be noted that, al-
though the capture of cultural property during times of war is an
ancient practice, the Nazi art looting campaign was conducted on an
"unprecedented scale." 39 As one scholar noted, "[F]or Hitler, both
the acquisition and cleansing of art fell squarely within his plan of a
pure Germanic empire. '40
The Nazis meticulously inventoried, catalogued, and photographed
all of the art they looted.41 They considered German and Germanic
30. Lippman, supra note 3, at 26.
31. Cuba, supra note 1, at 473. The Jeu de Paume Museum in Paris became one of the main
European warehouses for storing looted art. Id. There, art historians would stamp artworks
with a swastika that read "Property of the Third Reich." Id.
32. See Turner, supra note 23, at 1516. Those Jews who had been sent "to concentration
camps were considered to have fled and their possessions were 'legally' confiscated." Cuba,
supra note 1, at 473.
33. Falconer, supra note 18, at 395.
34. Id.
35. See Lippman, supra note 3, at 27. See also Falconer, supra note 18, at 383.
36. See Turner, supra note 23, at 1516.
37. Id. at 1514. As one author noted, "[W]hen they confiscated the possessions of French-
Jewish dealers, they were retaliating against the enemies of Germany, and when they pillaged
'Germanic art' from museums, churches, and private collections, . . .they were simply taking
back what was theirs and destroying items of no value." Id. at 1514-15.
38. Feliciano, supra note 15, at 3.
39. Falconer, supra note 18, at 383.
40. Id. at 383-84.
41. Walton, supra note 19, at 559. One scholar commented that "[w]orks of art deemed wor-
thy of the Reich were carefully stored, preserved, and treasured, while the lives of millions of
human beings were disregarded as worthless." Id. at 555.
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art, which included Dutch and Flemish art, to be at the pinnacle of
artistic accomplishment. 42 Hitler's "grand plan" for the art that he
considered worthy of the Third Reich "was to assemble the greatest
art collection of all time and house it in the 'Ftihrermuseum' in Linz,
Austria, Hitler's birthplace." 43 The Linz museum was intended to be a
monument to the Reich that would affirm the cultural dominance of
the German state.44 Further, it was "[t]his vision of cultural preemi-
nence and consolidation [that] was invoked to justify the Reich's ex-
tension of Germany's borders across the European continent. '45
As the Allied armies closed in on Germany, the Nazi troops moved
their collection of looted art into hundreds of bunkers, castles,
churches, sheds, and mines located throughout Germany. 46 In 1944,
when it became clear that Germany was on the verge of collapse, the
United States sent representatives to London to ensure proper repre-
sentation.47 When World War II ended in 1945,48 the United States
and the other Allies soon "became embroiled in the search for the
hordes of art and riches hidden all over Europe. '49
The Allied armies quickly established special agencies charged with
finding the true owners of recovered art.50 France created the Com-
mission de R~cup~ration Artistique one week after the liberation of
Paris to investigate and locate stolen artworks. 51 Similarly, the United
States and Britain established Monuments, Fine Arts and Architec-
42. Feliciano, supra note 15, at 3. As one author noted, the Nazis
aspired to return to a lost golden age. Its artistic palette was limited to traditional
landscapes, depictions of town and village life, still lifes, animal portraits and visions of
the noble and courageous knights of the Middle Ages. The human body invariably was
cast in a pale and classically proportioned form which embodied the alleged superior
beauty, strength, courage and grace of the Aryan race. These figures were portrayed in
a collective, compliant and coordinated effort that represented the organic unity and
intellectual leadership of the State. Art that did not fit this format was condemned.
Lippman, supra note 3, at 7.
43. Walton, supra note 19, at 557. Hitler had a three hundred page inventory of artworks,
titled the Kummel Report, that listed every work of art that had left Germany since the year
1500. Cuba, supra note 1, at 473. Hitler intended to collect every work listed in the Kummel
Report so he could pay homage to them at Linz. Id.
44. Lippman, supra note 3, at 27.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 28.
47. Walton, supra note 19, at 561.
48. By the time Paris was liberated from Nazi control in 1944, it is estimated that as much as
one-third of all art housed in private European collections had been looted. FELICIANO, supra
note 2, at 3-4.
49. See Walton, supra note 19, at 562. The Allied Powers consisted of the United States, the
United Kingdom, the French Republic, and the Soviet Union. Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v.
Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. 829, 831 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
50. Rosen & Hamburger, supra note 4, at 2.
51. FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 172-73.
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ture (MFA & A) to create precise lists of the victims of confiscation
and inventories of stolen works in an effort to ensure that recovered
artworks were returned to their rightful owners. 52 The United States'
and Britain's policy was to return recovered art objects to their coun-
tries of origin.53 However, when works that had belonged to the state
collections of Germany were recovered, it was the United States' pol-
icy to remove those works temporarily to the United States.54
Though the Allied agencies worked diligently to return recovered
works of art to their countries of origin, many problems arose. Ob-
jects were stored haphazardly or disappeared from their places of
storage, works were falsely claimed at the collecting points and subse-
quently disappeared into the black market, and seemingly legitimate
owners simply could no longer prove ownership. 55 The Allied forces
also lacked a uniform policy on restitution.5 6 Nevertheless, "it is not
quite right to say that nothing was done after the war. Hundreds of
thousands of works were returned to their owners, but, of course, not
everything was found or claimed." 57 Despite the efforts of both the
Commission and the MFA & A, thousands of stolen works of art were
reintegrated into the art market where their origins were either ef-
faced or forgotten, until finally, the artwork disappeared. 58
As the Cold War slowly came to an end in the early 1990s, many
previously classified government documents were released,5 9 prompt-
ing many Jewish families to renew their searches for lost art.60 How-
ever, in order to make a claim for the recovery of stolen art or even to
realize the existence of a claim, it is necessary to investigate family
52. Id. The Allies had art specialists on their side to identify and sort out the vast quantities of
art that were recovered and to preserve and salvage these works. Falconer, supra note 18, at 397.
53. Lippman, supra note 3, at 29.
54. See Falconer, supra note 18, at 398. Also, "heirless property," which is property that was
looted from those Jews who were exterminated, was turned over to the Jewish Restitution Suc-
cessor Organization, a group that distributed the objects to Jewish communities. Lippman, supra
note 3, at 29.
55. See Walton, supra note 19, at 563.
56. See Falconer, supra note 18, at 397-98.
57. Lynn Nicholas, The Rape of European Art, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 237, 240 (1998).
Between 1945 and 1949, MFA & A uncovered over fourteen hundred repositories in churches,
mines, castles, barns, and monasteries, and inventoried and returned literally millions of
artworks. Cuba, supra note 1, at 474-75.
58. See FELICIANO, supra note 2, at 177.
59. The Cold War is one reason why documents remained classified for so long. Turner, supra
note 23, at 1520. As this author noted, "[T]he need for America and its Western European
[including West Germany] allies to present a unified front [during the Cold War] may have
contributed to a desire not to inquire too deeply into the activities of those allies during and after
the war." Id.
60. See Rosen & Hamburger, supra note 4, at 3.
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archives and auction records in addition to government files. 61 These
sources of information are often located in several different coun-
tries.62 Furthermore, the difficulty in conducting a thorough investiga-
tion is only aggravated by the passage of time. Today, with tens of
thousands of works of art still missing, the need for further investiga-
tion is demanded by World War II survivors and their heirs.63
B. Case Law: Addressing Claims for the Recovery of Stolen Art
The key to resolving claims for the recovery of World War II looted
art lies in finding legal doctrines that allow courts to impose legal du-
ties that are concurrent with society's moral obligations. In order to
determine which legal theories are best suited to the resolution of
these claims, however, it is necessary to first explore some of the ma-
jor case law dealing with claims for the return of looted and stolen art.
1. Menzel v. List 64
One of the earliest cases to examine which legal doctrines and rules
apply to looted art claims was Menzel v. List. 65 On the defendant's
appeal from the trial court's order denying his motion to dismiss the
complaint, the appellate court affirmed the denial while managing to
establish some fundamental rules.66 The court first established that
"with respect to a bona fide purchaser of personal property a demand
by the rightful owner is a substantive, rather than a procedural prereq-
uisite to the bringing of an action .... ,,67 The court went on to state
that because the demand of a bona fide purchaser is substantive, the
statute of limitations should not begin to run until demand and refusal
has occurred. 68 In this way, the court determined that the plaintiff's
cause of action was not time-barred and the case was allowed to pro-
ceed to trial.69
61. See Cuba, supra note 1, at 461-462.
62. Id.
63. Restitution of Holocaust Assets: Hearing before the House Banking & Financial Services
Comm., 106th CONG. 94 (2000) (statement of Glenn D. Lowry, Director, The Museum of Mod-
ern Art). One author has suggested that governments and institutions should not only be en-
couraged, but should be pressured to grant the public access to their records. Cuba, supra note
1, at 462.
64. 253 N.Y.S.2d 43 (N.Y. App. Div. First Dept. 1964), affd, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (N.Y. Special
and Trial Term, New York County 1966), modified, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (A.D. I Dept. 1967), rev'd,
24 N.Y.2d 91 (N.Y. 1969).
65. Id.
66. Menzel, 253 N.Y.S.2d at 43.
67. Id. at 44.
68. Id.
69. Id.
1110 [Vol. 51:1103
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At trial, the facts surrounding the case were revealed. 70 The plain-
tiff, Mrs. Menzel, wished to recover the Marc Chagall painting that
she and her husband had left in their Brussels apartment when they
fled the Nazi invasion in March 1941. 71 Mr. and Mrs. Menze172 had
begun searching for the painting following the end of World War II,
but were unable to locate it until 196273 when Mrs. Menzel noticed a
reproduction of the painting in an art book.74 The art book stated that
the painting was in the possession of Albert A. List.75 List, a well-
known art collector, purchased the painting76 from Perls Galleries on
October 14, 1955. 7 7 Upon discovering that the painting was in List's
possession, Mrs. Menzel demanded its return, List refused, and this
legal action ensued.78
In her replevin action, Mrs. Menzel alleged that she was, and at all
times since 193279 had been, the lawful owner of the painting.80 Mrs.
Menzel further alleged that she had been and was now entitled to the
rightful possession of the painting.81 In her prayer for relief, Mrs.
Menzel demanded possession of the painting82 or its value, which was
estimated to be $22,500.83 In his answer, defendant List asserted the
70. Menzel, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804 (N.Y. Special and Trial Term, New York County 1966).
71. Id. at 806. The painting was entitled "Le Paysan a L'echelle," or in English, "The Peasant
and the Ladder." Id. at 807. The Nazi forces left a receipt indicating that the Chagall painting
was among the artworks taken into "safekeeping" on or about March 31, 1941. Id. at 806.
72. Mr. Menzel passed away in 1960 and was, therefore, not a party to this action. Id. at 807.
73. Id.
74. Menzel, 24 N.Y.2d at 93-94.
75. Id.
76. Perls Galleries sold the painting under the name "L'echelle de Jacob," or "Jacob's Lad-
der." Menzel, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 807.
77. Id. at 807. The whereabouts of the painting from 1941, when the Menzels fled Brussels, to
1955, when Perls Galleries purchased the painting from Galerie Art Moderne in Paris, are un-
known. Id. at 808.
78. Id. at 807. List brought in Klaus G. and Amelia B. Perls as third party defendants, who
were the proprietors of the Perls Galleries, the art gallery from which he purchased the painting.
Id. List alleged that the Perls were liable to him for breach of implied warranty of title. Menzel,
24 N.Y.2d at 94. In fact, it was undisputed that Perls Galleries represented and warranted to List
that they had valid title and were empowered to sell the painting to him. Menzel, 267 N.Y.S.2d
at 807. In their defense, the Perls argued that, among reputable art galleries, the offer of sale of
any painting was, in and of itself, warranty of title. Id. at 808. The Perls asserted that this was
part of the custom of trade among galleries. Id.
79. The Menzels purchased the painting in 1932 from the collection of Walter Schwarzenberg
through Galerie Georges Giroux in Brussels, and it remained in their home until 1941. Id. at
807-08.
80. Id. at 807.
81. Menzel, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 807.
82. Possession of the personal property at issue is the customary form of relief in replevin
actions. Id.
83. Id. The record reveals that the Menzels had purchased the painting in 1932 for 3800 Bel-
gian francs, the equivalent of $150. Id. at 808. The Perls purchased the painting from Galerie
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affirmative defense that the action was time-barred by the New York
Statute of Limitations.8 4
The court upheld the jury's verdict, holding that Mrs. Menzel was
the sole and rightful owner of the painting.85 The court found that the
Menzels had not abandoned the painting when they fled Belgium8 6
and the Nazis could not have conveyed good title to subsequent pur-
chasers.87 Further, the court reasoned that the defendant's statute of
limitations defense was unavailable because it was settled law in New
York that "[i]n replevin, as well as in conversion, the cause of action
against a person who lawfully comes by a chattel arises, not upon the
stealing or the taking, but upon the defendant's refusal to convey the
chattel upon demand."88 The court further stated that "[p]rovisions of
law for the protection of purchasers in good faith which would defeat
restitution [of Nazi confiscations] shall be disregarded."8 9 Noting that
"[t]he law stands as a bulwark against the handiwork of evil, to guard
to rightful owners the fruits of their labors," 90 the court ordered that
the painting be returned to Mrs. Menzel. 91
Art Moderne in Paris in July 1955 for $2,800 in French francs. Id. Mr. List, in turn, purchased
the painting from Perls Galleries in New York City on or about October 14, 1955 for $4,000. Id.
at 807.
84. Menzel, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 807.
85. Id. at 820.
86. "Abandonment" is defined as the "voluntary relinquishment of a known right." Id. at 809.
The court explained that the Menzels' relinquishment of the painting "in order to flee for their
lives was no more voluntary than the relinquishment of property during a holdup." Id. at 810.
As evidenced by the history of their search for the painting, the court found an obvious intent to
reclaim. Id.
87. Menzel, 267 N.Y.S.2d at 804. The court also rejected the notion that the seizure of the
painting constituted the lawful booty of war by conquering armies. Id. at 810. Instead, the court
found that the painting's taking constituted pillage, or plunder, which is the taking of private
property for the immediate prosecution of the war effort and is illegal. Id. at 811. In holding
that the Nazi troops could not have conveyed good title to subsequent purchasers, the court
recognized that "[w]here pillage has taken place, the title of the original owner is not extin-
guished." Id. (citing Mazzoni v. Finanze dello Stato, LII II Foro Italiano 960 (Tribunale di Vene-
zia, 1927)); Collac c. Etat Serbe-Croate-Slovene Yugoslavia, supra, IX Recueil des Decisions des
Tribunaux Arbitraux Mixtes 195, VI Hackworth, supra, at 403.
88. Menzel, 267 N.Y.S.2d. at 809 (citing Cohen v. M. Keizer, Inc., 246 App. Div. 277, 285
N.Y.S. 488 (1st Dept. 1936) [replevin]; Gillet v. Roberts, 57 N.Y. 28 (1874) [conversion]).
89. Id. at 819 (citing Law #59, U.S. Military Government for Germany, 10 Nov. 1947; Military
Government Gazette, Amtsblatt der Militarregierung Deutschland, Amerikanisches Kon-
trollgebiet, Part 1, Article 1, Para. 2).
90. Id. at 820.
91. Id. at 808. The court further held that List, upon delivery of the painting to Mrs. Menzel,
should recover its value, $22,500, from Perls Galleries. Id. at 808. This part of the holding was
the subject of further litigation. See Menzel, 279 N.Y.S.2d at 608-09 (modifying the judgment by
reducing the amount to be paid to List to the purchase price, $4,000, plus interest), rev'd, Men-
zel, 24 N.Y.2d at 97 (holding that List could only be put in the position he would have occupied
if the contract had been kept by Perls Galleries if he recovers the value of the painting at the
11.12
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2. Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon 92
One of the first cases to examine the choice of law and legal theo-
ries that apply to looted art claims was Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar
v. Elicofon.93 The Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) 94
commenced this action in 1969 by bringing a claim to recover posses-
sion of two portraits painted by the fifteenth century German artist
Albrecht Duerer.95 The paintings disappeared from a castle in the
German countryside 96 where they were sent for safekeeping during
World War I197 in the summer of 1945, which was the time that the
American troops in Germany were replaced by Soviet troops.98 In
time of judgment, $22,500). The New York Court of Appeals rejected Perls Galleries' argument
that a rule awarding the full value of the painting could ruin innocent sellers, such as themselves.
Id. at 98. The court stated that on the contrary, sellers could protect themselves by taking steps
to ascertain the status of title, and "should ... an inquiry produce no reasonable reliable infor-
mation as to the status of title, it is not requiring too much to expect that, as a reasonable
businessman, the dealer would himself either refuse to buy or, having bought, inform his vendee
of the uncertain status of title." Id.
92. 536 F. Supp. 829 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). affd, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982) [hereinafter
Elicofon].
93. Id.
94. Political differences and disagreement over the future of post-war Germany led to a divi-
sion between the Soviet Union and its Western Allies. Id. at 831. The Federal Republic of
Germany was established in the former British, French, and United States zones on September
21, 1949. Id. at 832. The German Democratic Republic was established on October 7, 1949 in
the former Soviet zone. Id.
95. Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 1152 n.1. The paintings, executed around 1499, are portraits of Hans
Tucher and his wife, Felicitas Tucher, painted in oil on wood.
96. Dr. Scheidig, the director of the Staatliche Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar museum (KZW)
at the time of the paintings' disappearance, testified and offered documents supporting the alle-
gation that the paintings were stolen sometime between June 12, 1945, when he last saw them in
a storeroom at the castle, and July 19, 1945, when the theft was discovered. Elicofon, 536 F.
Supp. at 836-37. In a letter to the Land Ministry dated July 21, 1945, Dr. Scheidig reported that
certain paintings had been stolen from the art depot and described the Duerer paintings as
among "the most valuable possessions of the Land of Thuringia." Id. at 835. Based on Dr.
Scheidig's testimony, the district court found, as a matter of law, that KZW presented a prima
facie case establishing that the Duerers were stolen from the Schloss Schwarzburg Castle some-
time between June 12, 1945 and July 19, 1945. Id. at 837.
97. In 1943, after World War II had begun, Dr. Scheidig, anticipating the bombardment of
Weimar, had the paintings along with other valuable museum items transferred to a storeroom in
the nearby Schloss Schwarzburg Castle, located in the District of Rudolstadt in the Land of
Thuringia. Id. at 831. The paintings remained in their place of safekeeping at the castle until the
time of their disappearance in 1945. Id.
98. Following the surrender of Hitler's government on May 8, 1945, the Allies issued a decla-
ration on June 5, 1945, stating that the Allied Powers assumed "supreme authority with respect
to Germany." Id. "For the purposes of occupation, Germany was divided into four zones with
one of the Four Powers assuming military authority over each zone to effect its own policy in
regard to local matters and the policy of the Allied Control Council in regard to matters affect-
ing Germany as a whole." Id. The American troops occupied (and were quartered at) the area
surrounding Schloss Schwarzburg Castle at the beginning of the summer of 1945, but were re-
placed by more permanent Soviet troops in July of that year. Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 155-56.
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1966, the paintings were discovered in the possession of Edward
Elicofon99 who purchased the paintings in good faith in 1946 from an
American serviceman in Brooklyn, New York.100
Following the recognition of the German Democratic Republic
(East Germany),' 0 ' the Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar (KZW), 10 2 a
museum operating in its capacity as an arm of the East German gov-
ernment, was granted the right to intervene as a plaintiff in 1975.103
Soon after, West Germany discontinued its claim without prejudice. 10 4
In 1978, the District Court for the Eastern District of New York dis-
missed the intervener complaint that was filed by the Grand Duchess
of Saxony-Weimar' 05 and held that the Grand Duchess' right to pos-
Records kept by the United States Army indicate that Russian troops replaced the Americans in
"Landkreis Rudolstadt" at about midnight on July 2, 1945. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. at 835 n.5. A
local newspaper, the Thuringer Volkszeitung, also reported the entry of Soviet troops into the
area on July 2, 1945. Id.
99. Elicofon discovered the true identity of the Duerer paintings in 1966 when a friend saw
them listed in a book describing art that had been looted during the war. Elicofon, 678 F.2d at
1156. Upon this discovery, Elicofon made his possession of the paintings public which in turn
precipitated the museum's demand for their return. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. at 833. The demand
was refused, and this litigation ensued. Id.
100. Id. at 830. Elicofon purchased the two unsigned Duerer portraits for $450. Elicofon, 678
F.2d at 1156.
101. In a Memorandum of Decision and Order dated September 25, 1972, the court denied
the Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar's motion to intervene on the ground that the museum was an
arm of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), a nation not recognized by the United States
at the time. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. at 832. However, when, on September 4, 1974, the United
States granted formal recognition to the GDR, the court accordingly vacated its prior order and
permitted the KZW to intervene as a plaintiff. Id.
102. The Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar was a museum located in what was at the time the
GDR. Id. at 830. Until 1943, the paintings were displayed in the Staatliche Kunstsammlungen
Zu Weimar, a museum located in Weimar, Thuringia and the predecessor to the post-German
Democratic Republic Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar. Id. at 831. This was the basis for the mu-
seum's claim to recover the paintings and the reason the court granted the museum the right to
intervene as plaintiff in this action. Id. at 830.
103. Id. at 830-31.
104. Id. Once the United States formally recognized the GDR government and the court had
thus permitted KZW to intervene as plaintiff, "the FRG in December 1975 was granted leave to
withdraw and discontinue its claim with prejudice on the ground that 'prior impediments to the
ability of Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar to pursue this action' had been removed." Elicofon, 678
F.2d at 1156.
105. The court stated:
Until 1927, the Duerer portraits which are the subject of this suit formed part of the
private art collection of the Grand Duke of Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach. Under the terms
of a Settlement Agreement of 1927 between the Land of Thuringia and the widow of
Wilhelm Ernst, the then owner of the private collection, title to the Grand Ducal Art
Collection had been transferred to the Land of Thuringia. Thuringia was created by
Federal German Law of April 20, 1920 and was the legal successor to the territory of
Weimar, which included as one of its seven subdivisions Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach, the
territory over which the Grand Dukes formerly had presided before being ousted from
power.
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session had passed to East Germany. 10 6 Consequently, by the time
the merits of the case were considered, the only remaining parties
were plaintiff KZW and defendant Elicofon.107
At trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York, KZW argued that while it was undisputed that Elicofon
had purchased the paintings in good faith, good faith was irrelevant to
the inquiry.10 8 KZW asserted that it was clear from the testimony of
Dr. Scheidig, the Deputy Director of KZW, that the paintings had
been stolen and Elicofon did not have good title because under New
York law, a thief cannot transfer good title even to a subsequent good
faith purchaser. 10 9
The court agreed and found as a matter of law that KZW had
presented a prima facie case establishing that the Duerers had been
stolen. 10 The court held that the statute of limitations did not begin
to accrue until KZW demanded the return of the paintings and
Elicofon refused.' The court also held that KZW had been "reason-
ably diligent" in its efforts to locate the paintings, and consequently,
any delay in making a demand was reasonable and excusable as a mat-
ter of law. 112 As a result, the court held that KZW had an immediate
right to possession. 113
Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. at 831. The court dismissed the intervener complaint of the Grand Duch-
ess, who had asserted ownership of the Duerers by assignment from her late husband, the Grand
Duke Carl August, on the basis of the Settlement Agreement of 1927. Id. at 831 n.1. The court
found that the Settlement Agreement of 1927 foreclosed any claim of ownership asserted by the
Grand Dukes after 1927. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 830-31.
108. Id. at 846. Good faith was irrelevant to the inquiry because the court found the paintings
were stolen and it was impossible for a thief to pass good title to a subsequent purchaser even if
the purchaser was acting in good faith. See infra note 295 and accompanying text.
109. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. at 833.
110. Id. at 837.
111. Id. at 829-830.
112. Id. at 852.
113. Id. at 857. Elicofon made two additional arguments that were rejected by the court at
trial. Id. at 829. First, Elicofon argued that even if the paintings were stolen from the castle, he
still could have acquired good title under the German law of "good faith acquisition." Elicofon,
536 F. Supp. at 839. Elicofon asserted that Fassbender, an architect living on the castle grounds
at the time of the disappearance of the paintings, stole the paintings but was able to transfer
good title to the paintings to the American serviceman, an innocent purchaser, from whom
Elicofon in turn purchased the paintings. Id. The court held that Fassbender was a Besitzdiener,
or possessor's servant, and, therefore, he lacked the element of possession that was necessary for
good title to be transferred to a bona fide purchaser under German law. Id. at 842-43. The court
alternatively held that Fassbender could not have conveyed good title to the American service-
man because United States Military Government Law, which was in effect in Germany and
superseded German law at the time of transfer, rendered void the transfer of any cultural prop-
erty. Id. at 843. Second, Elicofon argued that, even if he did not acquire good title to the paint-
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In 1982, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's holding. 114 The issue on appeal was
whether Elicofon acquired good title either by his good faith purchase
or as a result of his uninterrupted good faith possession for twenty
years.1 5 Elicofon argued that he purchased the unsigned Duerers in
1946 from an American serviceman who claimed that he purchased
the paintings at the end of the war, and that the paintings remained on
display in Elicofon's home for over twenty years.' 16
The court found that New York law prevented a subsequent good
faith purchaser from acquiring good title from a thief. 1 7 Further,
KZW's claim was not time barred because New York applies the de-
mand and refusal rule."18 Applied to the case at bar, the court held
that KZW's statute of limitations did not begin to run until October
1966 when the museum first learned that the Duerer paintings were in
Elicofon's possession, the museum demanded their return, and
Elicofon refused to return them.' 19 Therefore, because KZW's action
commenced in 1969, it was well within the three-year statute of limita-
tions and the action was not time-barred. 20 Further, because KZW
established that the paintings were stolen and it had a right of posses-
sion, the court ordered Elicofon to return the paintings to KZW.121
ings at the time of his purchase, he later acquired good title under the German law of Ersitzung.
/d. at 832. The doctrine of Ersitzung, Elicofon asserted, stated that title to movable property
may be obtained by the good faith acquisition and possession of the property without notice of a
defect in the title for the statutory period of ten years beginning at the time the rightful owner
loses possession. Id. at 845. The court held that under New York law questions relating to the
validity of transfer of personal property are governed by the law of the state where the property
is located at the time of the alleged transfer. Elicofon, 536 F. Supp. at 845-46. In this way, the
court did not need to reach the substantive issue of Ersitzung because under the New York
choice of law theory, German law was inapplicable. Id. at 845.
114. Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 1150.
115. Id. at 1153. Throughout the twenty years during which Elicofon had the paintings on
display in his home, countless people, including some who were knowledgeable about art,
viewed the paintings. Id. at 1156.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1160. The court also affirmed the district court's rejection of Elicofon's argument
that he acquired good title upon his purchase from the American serviceman, an innocent pur-
chaser, under the German law of "good faith acquisition." Id. at 1165-66. Similarly, the court
affirmed the district court holding that New York law governed and therefore, the German law
of Ersitzung was inapplicable. Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 1160.
118. Id. at 1161. See also infra notes 328-331 and accompanying text (defining the demand
and refusal rule and explaining its application to the stolen art context).
119. EFlicofon, 678 F.2d at 1161.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1165-66.
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3. DeWeerth v. Baldinger 1122
The DeWeerth v. Baldinger123 line of cases examines the doctrines
of due diligence and demand and refusal. These cases resulted from a
claim brought by Mrs. DeWeerth, the original owner of a Claude Mo-
net 12 4 painting entitled "Champs de Bl A Vetheuil,"'125 who sought its
return from a subsequent good faith purchaser. 126 Mrs. DeWeerth in-
herited the painting from her father upon his death in 1922.127 In Au-
gust of 1943, in the midst of World War II, Mrs. DeWeerth sent the
painting, along with other valuables, to her sister's house in Southern
Germany for safekeeping.1 28 Although the van that carried the goods
arrived safely, Mrs. DeWeerth never saw the painting again. 129 It dis-
appeared from her sister's home in the fall of 1945 without evidence
to explain the reason for the disappearance. 130
Upon learning of the painting's disappearance, Mrs. DeWeerth
made immediate efforts to locate it.131 In 1946, she reported the loss
to the military government that was administering the area at that
122. 658 F. Supp. 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), rev'd, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1056 (1988), amended by, 804 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'd, 28 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1231 (2d
Cir. May 16, 1994), amended by, 38 F.3d 1266 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1001 (1994).
123. Id.
124. The courts noted that Claude Monet was perhaps "the most well-known and widely ad-
mired member of the school of impressionist painters active in France in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries." DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 104.
125. The court described the painting:
The painting in the pending case, Monet's 'Champs de B16 A Wtheuil,' is one of a series
of similar impressionistic landscapes painted by the artist near the town of Vtheuil,
located on the Seine in Northern France. The oil painting, measuring 65 by 81 centime-
ters, shows a wheat field, a village, and trees. It is signed and dated "Claude Monet
'79." The painting is estimated to be worth in excess of $500,000.
Id.
126. DeWeerth, 658 F. Supp. at 691-92.
127. Id. at 690. Mrs. DeWeerth's father, Karl von der Heydt, purchased the Monet around
1908 and kept it on display in his house in Bad Godesberg, West Germany until the time of his
death in 1922. Id.
128. Id.
With the exception of the years 1927 to 1929, when the Monet was kept in her mother's
house, plaintiff kept the Monet in her residence in Wuppertal-Elberfeld from 1922 until
August 1943, where it was on display on a wall next to a sculpture by Auguste Rodin,
also inherited from her father. In August 1943, Mrs. DeWeerth sent the Monet, the
Rodin sculpture, and other valuables to the home of her sister Gisela von Palm (de-
ceased at the time of the lawsuit) in Oberbalzheim in Southern Germany.
Id. at 690.
129. Id. The court noted that United States soldiers were quartered in the house following the
end of the war in 1945. DeWeerth, 968 F. Supp. at 690. Noting that it was after the American
soldiers left that the Monet's disappearance was discovered, the court inferred "that either one
of the soldiers, or someone else, stole the painting ..... Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 691.
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time. 132 In 1948, she hired an attorney to aid in her recovery ef-
forts,1 33 and in 1955, she made inquiries of Dr. Alfred Stange, a re-
nowned art expert.' 34 Finally, in 1957, Mrs. DeWeerth reported the
Monet missing to the Bundeskriminalamt in Bonn. 135 After a decade
of unsuccessful attempts at recovery, Mrs. DeWeerth believed that she
had exhausted all remedies. 36
Meanwhile, unbeknownst to Mrs. DeWeerth, the Monet had found
its way into the Swiss art market by 1956, where it was purchased by
Wildenstein & Co., Inc., an art gallery in New York City.137 In 1957,
the defendant, Mrs. Baldinger, purchased the Monet from the Wilden-
stein Gallery. 138 Over the next two decades, the Monet was exhibited
only twice and referenced in only four publications. 39 In July 1981,
Mrs. DeWeerth's nephew discovered that the Monet had been exhib-
ited at the Wildenstein Gallery in 1970.140 The following year, Mrs.
132. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 105. "The report is no longer extant, but DeWeerth testified that it
was a standard government form in which she briefly described items she had lost during the
war." Id.
133. "In 1948, in a letter to her lawyer, Dr. Heinz Frowein, regarding insurance claims on
property she had lost, DeWeerth expressed regret about the missing Monet and inquired
whether it was 'possible to do anything about it.' Frowein wrote back that the Monet would not
be covered by insurance; he did not initiate an investigation." Id.
134. Id.
In 1955, DeWeerth sent [a] 1943 photograph of the Monet to Dr. Alfred Stange, a
former professor of art and an expert in medieval painting, and asked him to investi-
gate the painting's whereabouts. Stange responded that the photo was insufficient evi-
dence with which to begin a search, and DeWeerth did not pursue the matter with him
further.
Id.
135. The Bundeskriminalamt was the West German equivalent of the federal bureau of inves-
tigation. Id.
136. DeWeerth, 658 F. Supp. at 691.
137. Id. Records indicate that Wildenstein & Co., Inc. purchased the Monet from a Swiss art
dealer, Francois Reichenbach, in December 1956. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 105. Records further
indicate that the Wildenstein Gallery acquired the Monet on consignment. DeWeerth, 658 F.
Supp. at 691. Between December 1956 and June 1957, the Wildenstein Gallery had possession of
the Monet in New York. Id.
138. Id. Mrs. Baldinger purchased the Monet in June 1957 for $30,900. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at
105. A 1962 record kept by the Wildenstein Gallery shows a credit made to the Swiss art dealer
from whom the Monet was originally acquired. DeWeerth, 658 F. Supp. at 691. At the time of
the trial, the Monet was estimated to be worth over $500,000. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 104.
139. Id. The Monet was exhibited from October 29 until November 1, 1957 at a benefit held
at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York City, and again from April 2 until May 9, 1970 at an
exhibition entitled "One Hundred Years of Impressionism" held at the Wildenstein Gallery.
DeWeerth, 658 F. Supp. at 691. Published references to the Monet included two in catalogues
published in connection with the two above-mentioned exhibitions and two in publications to
which the Wildenstein Gallery was connected. Id.
140. Id. at 691.
DeWeerth learned of Baldinger's possession of the Monet through the efforts of her
nephew, Peter von der Heydt. In 1981, a cousin told von der Heydt that DeWeerth had
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DeWeerth retained an attorney, and after receiving a court order re-
quiring the Wildenstien Gallery to reveal the name of the painting's
current possessor, 141 Mrs. DeWeerth sent a letter dated December
1982 to Mrs. Baldinger demanding that she return the Monet. 142 In a
letter dated February 1983, Mrs. Baldinger refused to return the paint-
ing and the legal action subsequently ensued. 43
At trial, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York combined the defendant's affirmative defenses 44 into
one issue: whether the plaintiff's claim to recover the Monet was
timely and not unreasonably delayed. 145  In holding that Mrs.
DeWeerth did not unreasonably delay her demand for the return of
the painting, the court discussed the doctrines of due diligence and
demand and refusal. 146 First, the court applied the demand and re-
fusal rule, stating that the statute of limitations does not begin to run
until a demand is made to return the property and the demand is re-
fused. 147 The court held that because demand was made in 1982 and
refused in 1983, the action that was instituted in 1983 was well within
the three-year statute of limitations. 48
The court went on to discuss the doctrine of due diligence, stating
that a party may not unreasonably delay making a demand and that
owned a Monet that had disappeared during the war. Shortly thereafter, von der
Heydt identified the painting in a published volume of Monet's works . . . which he
found at the Wallraf-Richartz Museum in Cologne, less that 20 miles from where
DeWeerth had been living since 1957.
DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 105.
141. Id. In 1982, Mrs. DeWeerth retained counsel to determine whether the Wildenstein Gal-
lery knew the identity of the Monet's current possessor. Id. at 105-106. When the Wildenstein
Gallery refused to provide Mrs. DeWeerth with the owner's name, she commenced an action
against the gallery in the Supreme Court of New York. Id. The court subsequently ordered the
Wildenstein Gallery to reveal the identity of the Monet's current possessor in December 1982.
Id.
142. DeWeerth, 658 F. Supp. at 692.
143. Id.
144. Mrs. Baldinger argued that Mrs. DeWeerth's action should be barred by the defense of
laches or alternatively, by the statute of limitations. Id. at 693. Mrs. Baldinger asserted that the
action should be barred by the statute of limitations because of Mrs. DeWeerth's long delay in
asserting her claim and because Mrs. DeWeerth was not duly diligent in seeking to discover the
Monet's whereabouts. Id. Additionally, Mrs. Baldinger asserted the affirmative defenses of
waiver and estoppel. Id. at 693 n.7. The court, however, treated all of the defenses together
because they all raised the same issue: whether Mrs. DeWeerth's claim to recover the Monet was
timely and not unreasonably delayed. Id.
145. DeWeerth, 658 F. Supp. at 693.
146. Id. at 694.
147. Id. The court stated, "[u]nder N.Y.C.P.L.R. §214(3) the three year statute of limitations
does not commence running until a demand is made to return the property and the demand is
refused." Id.
148. Id. at 694.
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under Elicofon, the question of the amount of time that may be con-
sidered reasonable depends upon the circumstances of each case. 149
Here, because the plaintiff made a "diligent although fruitless ef-
fort"' 5 0 to locate and recover the Monet for the ten years following its
disappearance, her failure to make subsequent efforts between 1957
and her nephew's fortuitous discovery in 1981 was reasonable, based
on the small number of published references to the painting and Mrs.
DeWeerth's elderly age. 15' Consequently, the court held that the
claim was not barred on timeliness grounds.152
The court stated that in order to establish a cause of action in re-
plevin, t 53 a plaintiff must show that she has an immediate and superior
right to possession by proving ownership.154 Mrs. DeWeerth's testi-
mony and other documentary evidence 155 established that she was the
owner of the painting by inheritance from her father and she had
neither sold nor entrusted it to anyone else to sell; therefore, the court
held that she had a superior right to possession over Mrs. Baldinger
who was a subsequent good faith purchaser who could not trace the
title back to the original owner. 156 Furthermore, because the painting
was a unique chattel, or unique personal property, Mrs. Baldinger was
directed to deliver the painting to Mrs. DeWeerth, the original
owner.
157
149. Id.
150. Id. The court stated,
that (1) in 1946, she reported its loss to the military government then administering the
Bonn-Cologne area after the end of the war; (2) in 1948, she solicited the assistance of
her lawyer in endeavoring to find it; (3) in 1955, she made inquiries to an art expert she
knew of; and (4) in 1957, she reported it as missing to the Bundeskriminalamt. Thus
plaintiff made a 'diligent although fruitless effort' to find the Monet through 1957.
Id.
151. Id. The court stated,
that upon the circumstances of this case the plaintiff's failure to pursue the Monet after
1957 until her nephew discovered in 1981 that the Monet had been exhibited in New
York was reasonable. Mrs. DeWeerth was an elderly woman during that period, and
the only published references to the Monet were not generally circulated.
Id.
152. Id. at 695.
153. See infra notes 284-295 and accompanying text (explaining the elements of replevin).
154. DeWeerth, 658 F. Supp. at 695. The court stated that "[t]o establish a cause of action in
an action sounding in replevin under New York law, Mrs. DeWeerth must show that she has an
immediate and superior right to possession of the Monet." Id.
155. Mrs. DeWeerth provided a 1943 photograph which showed the Monet on display in her
residence. Id.
156. Id. at 688-89. The court stated that "Mrs. Baldinger, who indisputably purchased the
Monet in good faith and for value from Wildenstein in 1957, would prevail only if she could trace
her title back to Mrs. DeWeerth. This she cannot do. The trail back from Mrs. Baldinger leads
through Wildenstein to Reichenbach, and stops there." Id. at 695-96.
157. Id. at 688-89.
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed
the district court's opinion.158 At issue on appeal was whether New
York law required an individual claiming ownership of stolen personal
property to exercise due diligence in trying to locate the property so
as not to postpone the running of the statute of limitations in a suit
against a good faith purchaser. 159 In reaching its conclusion, the court
reviewed the rationale behind New York's demand and refusal rule. 160
The court recognized that where an owner pursues an action di-
rectly against the party who took his property, the statute of limita-
tions period begins to run as soon as the property is taken.16' In
contrast, when an owner pursues an action against a subsequent good
faith purchaser, the statute of limitations period begins to run only
after the return of the property is demanded and refused. 162 The
court stated that in these situations, an owner might not unreasonably
delay his demand. 163 Furthermore, the owner's efforts to locate the
stolen property must be reasonably diligent.' 64
By imposing these two duties on an owner who seeks to bring an
action against a subsequent good faith purchaser, the court reasoned
that the subsequent purchaser's rights were protected. 65 The court
also stated that without these two duties, "[state] policies would be
frustrated if plaintiffs were free to delay actions ... until the [stolen]
property's location fortuitously came to their attention. 1 66 For these
reasons, the court held that "under New York law an owner's obliga-
158. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 103.
159. Id. at 104.
160. Id. at 109-10.
161. Id. at 106. "The date of accrual depends upon the identity of the party from whom recov-
ery is sought. Where an owner pursues the party who took his property, the three-year period
begins to run when the property was taken." Id.
162. Id. "In contrast, where the owner proceeds against one who innocently purchases the
property in good faith, the limitations period begins to run only when the owner demands return
of the property and the purchaser refuses." DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 106.
163. Id. at 106-07.
Under New York law, even though the three-year limitations period begins to run only
once a demand for return of the property is refused, a plaintiff may not delay the action
simply by postponing his demand. Where demand and refusal are necessary to start a
limitations period, the demand may not be unreasonably delayed.
Id. at 107.
164. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 109. "In light of New York's policy of favoring the good faith
purchaser and discouraging stale claims.., we hold that under New York law an owner's obliga-
tion to make a demand without unreasonable delay includes an obligation to use due diligence to
locate stolen property." Id. at 109-10.
165. Id. at 109. "The purpose of the rule ... is to protect the innocent party by assuring him
notice before he is held liable in tort .... " Id. at 108.
166. Id. at 109.
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tion to make a demand without unreasonable delay includes an obli-
gation to use due diligence to locate stolen property.1 67
The court distinguished the plaintiff's efforts from the reasonably
diligent efforts of the plaintiff in Elicofon. 68 The court emphasized
the lack of detail contained in the reports that Mrs. DeWeerth filed
and listed steps that she did not take to locate the missing painting.169
Most notably, the court emphasized her failure to consult Monet's
Catalogue Raisonn , a definitive listing and accounting of the works
by the artist, where both exhibitions of the Monet were listed.170 In
sum, the court stated that "[t]o require a good-faith purchaser who
has owned a painting for thirty years to defend under these circum-
stances would be unjust. New York law avoids this injustice by requir-
ing a property owner to use reasonable diligence in locating his
property."117' Consequently, the court held that Mrs. DeWeerth filed
her action in an untimely manner because she failed to exercise rea-
sonable diligence to locate the painting after its disappearance. 172
4. Soloman R. Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubel 1 73
More recently, the doctrines of due diligence and demand and re-
fusal were examined in Guggenheim Foundation v. Lubell.'74 In that
case, the Guggenheim Museum brought an action against a good faith
167. Id. at 110.
168. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 111.
169. Id. at 111-12. The court noted that Mrs. DeWeerth had failed to publicize the loss of the
painting in the available listings designed to keep museums, galleries, and others abreast of sto-
len art. Id. at 111. The court also took notice of the fact that Mrs. DeWeerth had more or less
abandoned her search efforts between the years of 1957 and 1981. Id. at 112. Finally, the court
noted Mrs. DeWeerth's failure to take advantage of any of the post-war mechanisms that were
set up to locate art lost during World War 11. Id. Though Mrs. DeWeerth defended herself by
arguing that the post-war mechanisms were only concerned with art that had been looted by
Nazi troops, the court rejected her argument, reasoning that the post-war mechanisms were po-
tentially fruitful sources and should have been contacted. Id. at 111 n.6.
170. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 112. The court further pointed out that, under number 595 in
Monet's Catalogue Raisonnd, it is noted that Wildenstein sold the painting in 1957 in the United
States and that the painting was exhibited in 1970. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 104. The court stated,
This case illustrates the problems associated with the prosecution of stale claims ....
Memories have faded. To require a good-faith purchaser who has owned a painting for
30 years to defend under these circumstances would be unjust. New York law avoids
this injustice by requiring a property owner to use reasonable diligence in locating his
property. In this case, DeWeerth failed to meet that burden. Accordingly, the judg-
ment of the District Court is reversed.
Id. at 112. See infra notes 199-203 and accompanying text (discussing the post-Guggenheim, 1992
DeWeerth decision).
173. 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991).
174. Id.
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purchaser to recover a painting175 that was stolen by a former museum
employee.' 76 The facts of the case revealed that although the museum
discovered that the painting was stolen when it conducted the 1969-
1970 inventory of its collection, t77 it did not inform any other muse-
ums or the police.1 78 The museum claimed that publishing the theft
would have only driven the painting further underground. 179 In 1974,
the museum's Board of Trustees concluded that all efforts to recover
the painting were exhausted, and it voted to remove the painting from
its records.' 80 Meanwhile, the Lubells purchased the painting from a
gallery in May 1967181 and exhibited it twice, once in 1967 and again in
1981.182 In 1985, a Sotheby's employee who formerly worked for the
museum recognized the painting when a private art dealer brought a
transparency to the auction house.1 13 The Sotheby's employee noti-
fied the museum and, in 1986, the museum director, Thomas Messer,
sent a letter to the Lubells demanding the return of the painting.
8 4
Mrs. Lubell refused to return the painting and this action was com-
menced by the museum in 1987.185
At trial, the Supreme Court of the State of New York held that
because the museum did nothing for twenty years other than search its
own premises, its conduct was unreasonable as a matter of law and,
175. The painting at issue was a gouache painted by Marc Chagall in 1912. Guggenheim, 569
N.E.2d at 428. The gouache, called "Menageries" and also known as "Le Marchand de Bas-
tiaux," was worth an estimated $200,000 at the time of the lawsuit. Id. at 427. The gouache was
donated to the museum in 1937. Id. at 428. The action was technically brought by the Soloman
R. Guggenheim Foundation which operates the Guggenheim Museum. Id. at 427.
176. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 427.
177. Although the museum discovered that the painting was misplaced sometime in the late
1960s, it did not become aware that the painting was stolen until completing its inventory of the
entire museum collection in 1970. Id. at 428.
178. Id. The court noted that the museum failed to inform other museums, galleries, organi-
zations, the New York City Police Department, the F.B.I., Interpol, or any other law enforce-
ment authority of the theft. Id.
179. Id. "The museum asserts that this was a tactical decision based upon its belief that to
publicize the theft would succeed only in driving the gouache further underground and greatly
diminishing the possibility that it would ever be recovered." Id.
180. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 315-16.
181. The Lubells purchased the painting from the Robert Elkon Gallery, located in New York
City, in May 1967 for $17 million. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 428. The invoice and receipt
indicated that the painting had been in the private collection of the same former museum em-
ployee who came to be suspected of the theft. Id.
182. Id. The Lubells twice exhibited the painting at the Elkon Gallery. Id.
183. Id.
184. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 428. At the time the museum made its demand for the return
of the painting, the painting had been on display in the Lubells' home for twenty years. Id. at
427.
185. Id. at 428. The action was commenced by the museum on September 28, 1987 for either
recovery of the painting or, in the alternative, for $200,000. Id.
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therefore, its action was time-barred. 186 However, the Appellate Divi-
sion of the Supreme Court of New York found that the trial court had
erred in its conclusion that "delay alone can make a replevin action
untimely."187 In reaching its decision, the court relied on the
DeWeerth case, which predicted that the New York Court of Appeals
"would impose a duty of reasonable diligence in attempting to locate
stolen property, in addition to the undisputed duty to make a demand
for return within a reasonable time after the current possessor is iden-
tified. '188 In other words, in Guggenheim, the court agreed that sim-
ply bringing an action within the statute of limitations period after
demand and refusal did not end the inquiry. 189 Instead, the court
went on to consider "whether a reasonably diligent search could have
enabled the plaintiff to make an earlier demand."' 90 The court con-
cluded that the defendant's lack of due diligence argument had more
to do with a defense of laches than with the statute of limitations,1 91
and therefore, the defendant had to show prejudice in addition to
mere delay on remand.' 92
The issue on appeal was whether the museum's failure to take steps
to locate the painting was relevant to the Lubells' statute of limita-
tions defense. 193 The New York Court of Appeals agreed with the
Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York that the timing
of the museum's demand for the return of the painting and the defen-
dant's refusal to comply were the only factors relevant to assessing the
statute of limitations defense.' 94 In rejecting the rule established by
DeWeerth, the court held that "there is no reason to obscure [the de-
186. Id. at 429.
187. 550 N.Y.S.2d 618, 621 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
188. Id. at 620. (quoting DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 836 F.2d 103, 108 (2d Cir. 1987).
189. Id. at 621.
190. Id.
191. The court held that "whether plaintiff was obligated to do more than it did in searching
for the [painting] depends on whether it was unreasonable not to do more, and whether it was
unreasonable not to do more is an issue of fact relevant to the defense of laches, and not the
statute of limitations." Id. at 619.
192. Id. at 622.
[W]e prefer to characterize the defense urged here - lack of diligence in searching for
stolen property, as opposed to unreasonable delay in making a demand upon a known
possessor - as laches. Indeed, we do so mainly in order to point up that if such a
defense is to be deemed meritorious, prejudice must be articulated in addition to delay.
Guggenheim, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 622.
193. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 427.
194. Id. at 427.
[T]he appellant argues that the museum had a duty to use reasonable diligence to re-
cover the gouache, that it did not do so, and that its cause of action in replevin is
consequently barred by the Statute of Limitations. The Appellate Division rejected the
appellant's argument. We agree with the Appellate Division that the timing of the
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mand and refusal rule's] straightforward protection of true owners by
creating a duty of reasonable diligence."' 195 The court reasoned that
not only is reasonable diligence difficult to measure but placing the
burden of locating stolen artwork on the true owner is unduly burden-
some because the owner's chances of recovering what is rightfully his
are foreclosed if the burden is not met. 196 For these reasons, the court
held that the current possessor, and not the claimant, must prove that
a particular work of art is not stolen.19 7
5. DeWeerth v. Baldinger 11198
The DeWeerth case returned to court in 1992 in response to Gug-
genheim Foundation v. Lubell.199 In DeWeerth II, the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York noted that the
court in Guggenheim rejected the due diligence requirement for own-
ers attempting to recover stolen property from subsequent good faith
purchasers. 20 The court emphasized that the Guggenheim decision
museum's demand for the gouache and the appellant's refusal to return it are the only
relevant factors is assessing the merits of the Statute of Limitations defense.
Id.
195. Id. at 430.
196. Id. at 430-431.
All owners of stolen property should not be expected to behave in the same way and
should not be held to a common standard. The value of the property stolen, the man-
ner in which it was stolen, and the type of institution from which it was stolen will all
necessarily affect the manner in which a true owner will search for missing property.
We conclude that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to craft a reasonable diligence
requirement that could take into account all of these variables and that would not un-
duly burden the true owner.
Id. at 431.
197. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 431. "In our opinion, the better rule gives the owner rela-
tively greater protection and places the burden of investigating the provenance of a work of art
on the potential purchaser." Id. Indeed, the trial court noted that in this case, the "defendant's
vigilance is as much in issue as plaintiff's diligence." Guggenheim, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 623.
198. 804 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev'd, 38 F.3d 1266 (2d Cir. 1994).
199. DeWeerth, 804 F. Supp. 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991)
(Mrs. DeWeerth initiated a second action following the 1991 Guggenheim decision holding that
the burden for proving an artwork is not stolen is on the current possessor).
200. DeWeerth, 804 F. Supp. at 544. The court stated,
[T]he New York Court of Appeals in Guggenheim explicitly held that the due diligence
requirement announced in DeWeerth was contrary to state law: 'We have reexamined
the relevant New York case law and we conclude that the Second Circuit should not
have imposed a duty of reasonable diligence on the owners of stolen artwork for pur-
poses of the Statute of Limitations .... The history of [proposed legislation seeking to
establish a discovery rule for the recovery of stolen artworks] when considered together
with the abundant case law spelling out the demand and refusal rule, convinces us that
that rule remains the law in New York and that there is no reason to obscure its
straightforward protection of true owners by creating a duty of reasonable diligence.'
Id. (quoting Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 429-430).
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was based on the rationale that "[t]o place the burden of locating sto-
len artwork on the true owner ... would, we believe, encourage illicit
trafficking in stolen art."' 20 The court then concluded that the Gug-
genheim decision constituted a new development justifying relief from
judgment. 20 2
On the second appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held in a split decision that the district court abused its
discretion in granting relief from judgment based either on the state
court's decision as extraordinary circumstances or the finding that the
state court's judgment had prospective application.203
6. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg
& Feldman Fine Arts, Inc.20 4
The next case to give a detailed consideration to which legal doc-
trines apply to the recovery of stolen art is Autocephalous Greek-Or-
thodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg.205 In this case, the Republic of
Cyprus and the Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus
brought an action against an Indiana art dealer for the recovery of
four stolen mosaics. 20 6 The issue was whether the art dealer, an alleg-
edly good faith purchaser, or the Church from which the mosaics were
stolen was entitled to the right to possess the mosaics.207 The sixth
century mosaics, which remained for centuries in a church in Cyprus,
were removed sometime during the 1970s following the Turkish
invasion.208
201. DeWeerth, 804 F.Supp. at 548 (quoting Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 431).
202. Id. at 539.
203. DeWeerth, 38 F.3d 1266 (2d Cir. 1994). See supra notes 122-172 and accompanying text.
204. 717 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D. Ind. 1989), affd, 917 F.2d 28 (7th Cir. 1990), reh'g denied en
banc, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 20398 (7th Cir. Nov. 21, 1990), stay vacated, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6582 (S.D. Ind. May 3, 1991).
205. Id.
206. Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1374.
207. Id. at 1375. The mosaics, known as the mosaics of the Church of the Panagia Kanakaria,
were made up of one set of four mosaics and were one of only six or seven sets of Byzantine
mosaics to survive the Iconoclasm. Id. at 1377. The Iconoclasm, which occurred during the
eighth century, was a time during which images were destroyed so they would not become ob-
jects of veneration. Id. The mosaics at issue had been affixed to the Kanakaria Church in
Lythrankomi, Cyprus in 530 A.D. and depicted Jesus Christ as a young boy seated in the lap of
his mother, the Virgin Mary, and surrounded by the North Archangel, the apostle Matthew, and
the apostle James. Id. at 1377-78. Each of the four mosaics was approximately two square feet
in dimension. Id. at 1378.
208. Id. In July 1974, Turkish military forces invaded and seized control of the island of Cy-
prus. Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1378. The Kanakaria Church was located in the village of
Lythrankomi in Northern Cyprus, an area controlled by Turkish military forces. Id. Following
the 1974 invasion, the government of the Republic of Cyprus and the Church of Cyprus were
generally prevented from having access to occupied Northern Cyprus. Id. at 1379. However,
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Meanwhile, in 1988, the defendant, Peg Goldberg, who was Presi-
dent of Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., an Indiana art gallery and dealer,
purchased the mosaics from a Dutch art dealer.20 9 She testified that
she purchased the mosaics in good faith and without reasonable notice
that they were stolen and that Turkish Cypriot officials authorized the
transaction. 210 In the fall of 1988, upon returning to the United States,
Goldberg contacted various art dealers in an attempt to find a buyer
for the mosaics.211 Eventually, word that the mosaics were for sale
reached Dr. Marion True at the Getty Museum in California who, be-
cause of their close working relationship, contacted Cypriot offi-
cials.212 Upon learning of the existence of the mosaics from Dr. True,
the plaintiffs soon discovered that they were located in Indianapolis 213
regular religious services continued to be conducted at the Kanakaria Church by the pastor,
Father Antomis Christopher, until July 1976 when he was forced to flee the region. Id. When
Father Christopher fled to Southern Cyprus in July 1976, the mosaics were still affixed to the
church. Id. Based on reports from people who remained in the occupied area, sometime be-
tween August of 1976 and October of 1979, the interior of the church was vandalized and the
mosaics were forcibly removed. Id.
209. Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1381-83. In 1988, Goldberg flew to Amsterdam where
she met up with an Indianapolis art dealer and a casual acquaintance of hers, Robert Fitzgerald.
Id. at 1381. Fitzgerald informed Goldberg that he knew of four mosaics that were for sale and
then put her in touch with a Dutch art dealer, Michel Van Rijn, and the California attorney
representing Van Rijn and Fitzgerald, Ronald Faulk. Id. Van Rijn showed Goldberg pictures of
the mosaics and told her he could arrange the sale. Id. at 1381. Van Rijn identified the seller as
Aydin Dikman who he said had "found" the mosaics in the rubble of a church. Id. Goldberg
next enlisted attorney Faulk and sent him to see Dikman and to tell him that she was interested
in buying. Id. at 1382. Faulk returned with documents which purported to show that export of
the mosaics would be proper. Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1382. Goldberg the purchased the
mosaics for $1,080,000. Id.
210. Id. at 1376. Goldberg testified that she contacted the International Foundation for Art
Research in New York and UNESCO's Geneva office as well as customs offices in the United
States, Germany, Switzerland, and Turkey to inquire as to whether the mosaics were reported
stolen or missing and whether any treaties might prevent their importation to the United States.
Id. at 1382.
211. Id. at 1384. Among others, Goldberg contacted a New York and Geneva art dealer, Dr.
Geza von Habsburg, who in turn contacted Dr. Marion True at the Getty Museum. Id.
212. Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1384. When von Habsburg contacted her, Dr. True ex-
plained that the Getty Museum did not collect Byzantine art. Id. She also
told von Habsburg that, because of her close working relationship with Cyprus, it
would be necessary for her to contact her friend Dr. Vassos Karageorghis about the
mosaics. Dr. True had developed a working relationship with Dr. Karageorghis, and he
had often spoken to her of Cyprus's attempts to recover the mosaics. Dr. True then
called Dr. Karageorghis, who told her that export of the mosaics was not authorized by
Cyprus and that the mosaics she described were the mosaics which Cyprus had been so
interested in recovering. Dr. True gave Dr. Karageorghis the name of Geza von Habs-
burg and how to contact him.
Id.
213. The court stated,
In November 1988, Dr. Karageorghis and Papageorghiou, in conjunction with Cyprus's
Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, contacted the Ambassador of Cy-
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and wrote a letter to Goldberg demanding their return.214 Goldberg
refused to return the mosaics and the ensuing lawsuit was
commenced.215
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indi-
ana found that a thief does not have title to or the right to possession
of stolen items; therefore, a thief cannot pass title or the right to pos-
session of stolen items to subsequent purchasers like Goldberg. 216 In-
diana law also utilizes the discovery rule, which states that the statute
of limitations period begins to run when the damage is first discovered
or, when through the use of due diligence, the damage could have
been discovered. 217 In this way, the discovery rule qualifies the due
diligence rule in that the discovery rule prevents the statute of limita-
tions from beginning to run in situations where a plaintiff using due
diligence cannot bring suit because she cannot determine a cause of
action. 218 In other words, in order to bring a successful replevin ac-
tion, a plaintiff must know who is in possession of the specific prop-
erty; however, if the plaintiff is unable to determine the identity of the
possessor of the property, she cannot maintain a cause of action in
replevin.219
prus in Washington, D.C. They informed the Ambassador of the mosaics' existence in
the United States and suggested that immediate and discreet action be taken to recover
the mosaics. The embassy then began working with its ... Washington law firm ... to
determine the location and possessor of the mosaics.
Id. Meanwhile, by January 1989, Goldberg had also contacted her friend, New York art dealer
Barbara Divver, about the Getty Museum's possible acquisition of the mosaics. Id. Divver then
contacted the Director of the Getty Museum, John Walsh, who in turn put Divver into contact
with Dr. True. Id. Subsequently, "Dr. True told Divver that Dr. True would report this contact
to the plaintiffs' Washington law firm and to U.S. Customs, which she did." Id. Soon after, the
plaintiffs discovered that the mosaics were in Goldberg's possession in Indianapolis. Id. at 1385.
214. Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1384.
215. Id. at 1385.
216. Id. at 1376. The court stated that "[t]here are long established rules of law in Indiana
that a thief never obtains title to stolen items, and that one can pass no greater title than one has.
Therefore, one who obtains stolen items from a thief never obtains title to or right to possession
of the item." Id. at 1398 (citations omitted).
217. Id. at 1386. "Indiana recognizes a discovery rule as it may affect the running of a statute
of limitations." Id.
218. Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1389. "The discovery rule prevents the statute from be-
ginning to run in situations where a plaintiff, using due diligence, cannot bring suit because he is
unable to determine a cause of action." Id.
219. Id. The court stated,
In a replevin action, a plaintiff sues a defendant for the recovery of specific property.
An element of the cause of action is the defendant's wrongful detaining or wrongful
possession of the property sought to be recovered. In order to maintain a replevin
action, the plaintiff must know who is in possession of the property at issue. If a plain-
tiff is unable to determine the possessor of stolen items, the plaintiff cannot maintain a
cause of action in replevin.
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Here, the Republic of Cyprus' Department of Antiquities first
learned of the mosaics' disappearance in the fall of 1979.220 The Re-
public immediately contacted the United Nations Educational, Scien-
tific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 221 the International
Council of Museums,222 the International Council of Museums and
Sites,223 and Europa Nostra,224 as well as officials at major museums
and auction houses throughout the world.2 25 Despite its efforts, the
Republic did not discover the whereabouts of the mosaics for nearly a
decade, when Dr. True of the Getty Museum contacted them in
1988.226 The court held that the action did not accrue until 1988 when
the plaintiff discovered the location and identity of the possessor of
the mosaics and, therefore, the action was timely. 227
220. Id. at 1380. See supra notes 208, 211-212 and accompanying text (describing the theft of
the mosaics and their subsequent discovery in the United States).
221. Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1380.
In response to the widespread theft and destruction of cultural property during World
War II, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) convened an international conference at The Hague in 1954. The confer-
ence was held 'for the purpose of drawing up and adopting a Convention for the Pro-
tection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict ... .' In the early 1970s,
the Sixteenth General Conference of UNESCO adopted 'The Convention on the
Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Owner-
ship of Cultural Property . . . .' In 1983, the United States ratified the UNESCO Con-
vention with the passage of 'The Convention on Cultural Property Implementation
Act.' This act provided in part: 'No article of cultural property documented as apper-
taining to the inventory of a museum or religious or secular public monument or similar
institution in any State Party which is stolen from such institution ... may be imported
into the United States.'
Id. at 1379 n.2. However, the court noted that the above-mentioned conventions were not con-
trolling in this case. Id.
222. The International Council of Museums is "an organization that coordinates and develops
measures and security for museums throughout the world." Id. at 1380.
223. The International Council of Museums and Sites is "an organization that works with
restorers and specialists in the preservation of ancient monuments." Id.
224. The court described Europa Nostra's involvement as follows:
The Republic of Cyprus introduced a resolution concerning the missing mosaics to Eu-
ropa Nostra, a European organization interested in the conservation of the architec-
tural heritage of Europe. The Republic of Cyprus sent the Europa Nostra resolution to
the Council of Europe, which it believed would give wide publicity to the problem.
Id.
225. Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1380. The Department of Antiquities also contacted indi-
viduals at the British Museum, the Louvre, Christie's, Sotheby's, and Harvard University's Dum-
barton Oaks Institute for Byzantine Studies. Id. Additionally, colleagues, scholars, journalists,
political leaders, and departments of antiquities throughout the world were contacted. Id.
226. Id. at 1384. See supra notes 211-213 and accompanying text (describing the discovery of
the mosaics in the United States).
227. Id. at 1389, 1391. "[T]he Court concludes that the plaintiffs did not know and were not
reasonably on notice of the identity of the possessor of the mosaics until late 1988." Id. at 1389.
Furthermore, "[tlhe plaintiffs exercised due diligence but were unable to determine who pos-
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The court also held that the action would be considered timely
under the doctrines of fraudulent concealment 28 and equitable estop-
pel.229 Under Indiana law, an action for fraudulent concealment may
be brought where the location of missing property is actively and in-
tentionally concealed in such a way that the plaintiff's inquiry or in-
vestigation is misled or hindered.230 As long as a plaintiff is duly
diligent in her search,231 the statute of limitations period does not be-
gin to toll until the location of the property is finally discovered.2 32
The court held that the mosaics' location had been fraudulently con-
cealed; 233 therefore, the statute of limitations did not begin to toll un-
til 1988 when the Republic of Cyprus first became aware that the
mosaics were in Goldberg's possession.2 34
Equitable estoppel, on the other hand, forecloses the use of the stat-
ute of limitations by a defendant who, through fraud or misrepresen-
tation, prevents a plaintiff from commencing an action within the
sessed the mosaics until that time. Therefore, the plaintiffs' cause of action did not accrue until
late 1988." Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1391.
228. Id. at 1391-92. "Assuming for purposes of discussion that the cause of action accrued in
this case when the mosaics were stolen sometime between 1976 and 1979, the Court concludes
that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment operates under the facts of this case to toll the six-
year statute of limitations." Id. See infra notes 300-303 and accompanying text.
229. Id. at 1393. "[The Court concludes that the statute of limitations was tolled by fraudu-
lent concealment and equitable estoppel ..... Id.
230. Id. at 1387. The court stated that "the doctrine [of fraudulent concealment] operates to
disallow a defendant, who by deceit or fraud prevents a plaintiff from learning of a cause of
action, from taking advantage of his own wrong by asserting the statute of limitations as a bar to
the plaintiff's action." Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1387. The court also stated that "[t]o
invoke the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, Indiana requires that the concealment be active
and intentional, and that such concealment misleads or hinders the plaintiff's inquiry or ability to
investigate." Id.
231. "For a plaintiff to invoke the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, Indiana requires that
the plaintiff exercise due diligence to investigate the claim and attempt to discover the fraud."
Id.
232. Id. at 1387-88.
If the fraud, although not discovered, ought to have been discovered, and could have
been if reasonable diligence had been exercised by the plaintiff, the statute will run
from the time discovery ought to have been made. To prevent the barring of an action,
it must appear that the fraud not only was not discovered, but also could not have been
discovered with reasonable diligence, until within the statutory period before the action
was begun.
Id. at 1387-88 (quoting Guy v. Schuldt, 138 N.E.2d 891, 896 (Ind. 1956)).
233. The court explained its application of fraudulent concealment:
The doctrine [of fraudulent concealment] operates because the possessor and location
of the mosaics were actively and fraudulently concealed from the plaintiffs. The fact
that the mosaics were stolen and resurfaced in the art world after a period of approxi-
mately nine years indicates by its very nature that the mosaics were fraudulently con-
cealed from the true owner, the Church of Cyprus.
Id. at 1392.
234. Id. at 1391-92.
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statute of limitations' time frame.235 Here, the court similarly held
that because the Republic and Church of Cyprus had been prevented
from commencing their action until the 1988 discovery of the mosaics,
their action was timely under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. 236
Although the court held that the plaintiffs' action was timely under
a number of legal theories, it nevertheless concluded that under Indi-
ana law, replevin was the proper legal theory for the recovery of the
mosaics.237 The court continued its analysis by explaining that in or-
der for a plaintiff to succeed in a replevin action, she must prove three
elements: 1) that she has title or right to possession, 2) that the prop-
erty has been unlawfully detained, and 3) that the defendant is in
wrongful possession of the property.238 The court held that because
the owners had not authorized the removal or sale of the mosaics 239
and because Goldberg did not obtain good title or the right to posses-
sion of the mosaics,240 the plaintiffs satisfied the elements of re-
plevin.241 Finally, because the mosaics were part of the religious,
artistic, and cultural heritage of the Republic and Church, the court
held that the Church was entitled to possession of the mosaics. 242
235. Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1388, 1393. "[U]nder equitable estoppel, '[a] defendant
may be prevented from relying upon a statute of limitations by his own misrepresentations or
fraud, even though he has not concealed the cause of action."' Id. at 1388 (quoting Marcum v.
Richmond Auto Parts Co., 270 N.E.2d 884, 886 (Ind. Ct. App. 1971)).
236. Id. at 1393.
237. Id. at 1395. The court found that "[u]nder Indiana law, replevin is the proper legal the-
ory for the recovery of personal property." Id. The court also determined that "[b]ecause the
plaintiffs have requested the return of their uniquely valuable mosaics, the Court considers re-
plevin as the more appropriate characterization of this case .... Therefore the Court will ana-
lyze the plaintiffs' claims under the elements of a cause of action for replevin." Id. at 1396.
238. Id. at 1396-97. "In Indiana to prove a claim for replevin, a plaintiff must prove that he
has title or right to ownership, that the property has been unlawfully detained, and that the
defendant is in wrongful possession of the property." Id.
239. Id. at 1379. "Neither the Republic of Cyprus nor the Church of Cyprus has ever author-
ized the removal or sale of the Kanakaria mosaics." Id.
240. Id. at 1399. "The evidence of theft and chain of possession under the facts of this case
lead only to the conclusion that Goldberg came into possession of stolen property. Under Indi-
ana law, she never obtained any title or right to possession." ld.
241. Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1399. "Under Indiana law, the Court concludes that the
plaintiffs have made credible and persuasive showings of the elements necessary for the replevin
of personal property." Id.
242. Id. at 1376.
The mosaics are unique. The paramount significance of their existence is as part of the
religious, artistic, and cultural heritage of the Church and the government of Cyprus,
and as part of the national unity of the Republic of Cyprus. Therefore, the Court or-
ders that possession of the mosaics is awarded to the plaintiff, the Autocephalous
Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus.
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On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit considered when the statute of limitations began to toll.2 43 The
court agreed with the district court's general rule of due diligence: "a
cause of action accrues when the plaintiff ascertains, or by due dili-
gence, could ascertain, actionable damages. '2 44 As a corollary to the
due diligence rule, the court recognized the discovery rule, 245 which
states that the statute of limitations begins to run on the day a plaintiff
knows or discovers that an injury has been suffered and that it was
caused by the act of another.246
Thus, the court found that Cyprus had been duly diligent in its
search for the missing mosaics because Cyprus had taken "substantial
and meaningful steps from the time it first learned of the disappear-
ance of the mosaics to locate and recover them. '247 Further, the court
found that under the discovery rule, Cyprus' cause of action did not
accrue until 1988 when it learned from Dr. True of the Getty Museum
that the mosaics were in Goldberg's possession in Indiana.248 Because
Cyprus was not reasonably on notice of the location and possessor of
the mosaics until 1988, the court held that Cyprus' action was
timely.249 Finally, the court held that because the mosaics were re-
243. Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v. Goldberg and Feldman Fine Arts,
Inc., 917 F.2d 278, 288 (7th Cir. 1990). "[T]he dispositive determination is when did Cyprus'
cause of action 'accrue' within the meaning of Indiana's limitations statute." Id.
244. Id.
245. See infra notes 315-318 and accompanying text (defining and explaining the application
of the discovery rule).
246. Autocephalous, 917 F.2d at 288. The court recognized,
as a corollary to this general [due diligence] rule, a 'discovery rule' for the accrual of a
cause of action; to wit, 'the statute of limitations commences to run from the date plain-
tiff knew or should have discovered that she suffered an injury or impingement, and
that it was caused by the product or act of another.'
Id. (quoting Burks v. Rushmore, 534 N.E.2d 1101, 1104 (Ind. 1989)) (quoting Barnes v. A.H.
Robins Co., Inc., 476 N.E.2d 84, 87-88 (Ind. 1985)).
247. Id. at 290. The court found that "[tihe record evidence ... makes it clear that ... the
Republic of Cyprus ... took substantial and meaningful steps, from the time it first learned of
the disappearance of the mosaics, to locate and recover them." Id. The court concluded by
stating: "[I]n sum, then, [district court] Judge Noland's conclusion that Cyprus was duly diligent
and should not have discovered its cause of action before late 1988 stands on firm factual foot-
ing." Id.
248. Id. at 288-89.
[District Court] Judge Noland [correctly] concluded that an Indiana court would find
that Cyprus' action was timely filed. His primary ground for so concluding was his
determination that, under a discovery rule, Cyprus' cause of action did not accrue until
Cyprus learned from Dr. True that the mosaics were in Goldberg's possession in
Indiana.
Id.
249. Autocephalous, 917 F.2d at 288-289. "[District court] Judge Noland [correctly] ruled that
Cyprus was not, nor reasonably should have been, on notice as to the possessor or location of the
mosaics until late 1988." Id. at 289.
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moved from the church without the authority of the Republic or the
Church and because Goldberg had no valid title or right to possession
of the mosaics, Cyprus was entitled to possession of the mosaics. 250
For these reasons, the court affirmed the holding of the district
court.25'
7. Rosenberg v. Seattle Art Museum 252
The most recent case to address the problem of art stolen during
World War II is Rosenberg v. Seattle Art Museum.253 Rosenberg in-
volved an action brought by the daughter and daughter-in-law of
French art dealer Paul Rosenberg to recover a painting that had been
looted by the Nazis but was later found to be in the possession of the
Seattle Art Museum (SAM). 254 The painting, a 1928 Matisse entitled
"L'Odalisque," was left to the museum by the Bloedel family. 255 Mrs.
Bloedel and her husband, Prentice Bloedel, had purchased the paint-
ing from the Knoedler Gallery in New York City in 1954.256 Just after
purchasing the painting, Mrs. Bloedel "must have expressed some
concern," because a Knoedler employee wrote her a letter detailing
250. Id. at 291. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
251. Autocephalous, 917 F.2d at 278. Specifically, the court reviewed and affirmed the three
elements applied by the district court judge. Id. at 291. First, the court held that the "Kanakaria
Church was and is owned by the Holy Archbishopric of the Church of Cyprus, a self-headed
church associated with the Greek-Orthodox faith." Id. Second, the court held that "the mosaics
were removed from the Kanakaria Church without the authority of the Church of Cyprus or the
Republic [of Cyprus]." Id. Finally, the court held that "Goldberg, as an ultimate purchaser from
a thief, has no valid claim of title or right to possession of the mosaics." Id.
252. 42 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (W.D. Wash. 1999), partial summary judgment granted and dismissed,
70 F. Supp. 2d 1163 (W.D. Wash. 1999), vacated, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7770 (W.D. Wash. Mar.
2, 2000).
253. Id.
254. Rosenberg, 42 F. Supp.2d at 1031-32.
255. Id. at 1031-1032.
SAM took possession of L'Odalisque in 1991 through a bequest in the will of Mrs.
Virginia Bloedel (Jinny) and a trust established by her husband, Mr. Prentice Bloedel
(Bing). SAM obtained full ownership of the painting upon Bing's death in 1996. The
Bloedels, in turn, had purchased L'Odalisque from third-party defendant Knoedler-
Modarco, Inc. (or its corporate predecessor) in 1954.
Id. at 1032.
256. Id. at 1032.
In August and September of 1954, the Bloedels were in New York to be with [their
daughter] Virginia when she gave birth to twins. The twins were late, and, according to
Virginia, her parents spent their time "shopping" at Knoedler's gallery, where they
found L'Odalisque and reached an agreement to have it sent to their home on Bain-
bridge Island [in Washington] .... On November 11, 1954, Knoedler typed up a bill of
sale transferring ownership of L'Odalisque to the Bloedels in exchange for $19,000.
Id. at 1032. The Knoedler Gallery claimed to have purchased the painting from a Paris gallery.
Rosenberg, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 1166 n.1.
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the painting's provenance. 257 Although it appears that the gallery had
accurate information regarding the painting's history, the facts set
forth in the letter were false.258 For this reason, the museum brought
a third party action for fraud against the gallery.2 59
After holding that the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington had and would exercise jurisdiction over the
claims, 2 60 the same court examined this action on its merits.261 The
museum had, in the meantime, acknowledged that the Rosenberg
heirs were, in fact, the rightful owners of the painting and returned the
Matisse to them. Therefore, the issue at trial was whether in the
painting's post-war chain of possession, the museum or the gallery
should suffer the loss. 262 Though it appeared from the record that the
gallery had defrauded the Bloedels by not informing them of the
painting's true provenance, the court held that the museum did not
have standing to sue the gallery for fraud committed against another
party. 263
In 2000, the District Court for the Western District of Washington
reconsidered the facts of the case when the museum filed a motion for
reconsideration. 264 Although the court rejected all three of the errors
257. Rosenberg, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1032. Knoedler employee, Lelia Wittler, wrote a letter to
Mrs. Bloedel in December 1954, "detailing the artist's ownership and exhibitions of L'Odalisque
in 1937 and 1938." Id. The letter read as follows:
I am sorry there was any question left unanswered in your mind, but ... we do not
know the name of the former owner. The Paris dealer from whom we bought the Ma-
tisse would not give out the name of the former owner, as they always hoped to get
more pictures from the same source. This picture ... was without doubt in [the former
owner's] possession through 1938. As it was published in a Swedish publication in
1938, it may have gone to Sweden and was in some Swedish collection. However, from
then on it was owned privately by this collection, from which it now comes, and whose
identity we are unable to get from the Paris dealer.
Rosenberg, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 1166 n.1.
258. Rosenberg, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1032. Despite what the letter said, records indicate that the
Knoedler Gallery possessed information that showed that the painting belonged to Paul Rosen-
berg before World War 11 and that much of Rosenberg's collection was looted during the Nazi
occupation of Paris. Rosenberg, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 1166.
259. Rosenberg, 42 F. Supp. 2d at 1029, 1032.
260. Id. The court held that, despite the fact that personal jurisdiction was present as to only
the tort claims, and not the contract claims, the "court would exercise jurisdiction over all claims
to promote justice and efficiency." Id.
261. Rosenberg, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 1165.
262. Id. "SAM has agreed that the Rosenberg heirs are the rightful owners of the painting
and have given it to them. The question remaining is who in L'Odalisque's postwar chain of
possession will suffer the loss." Id. at 1165.
263. Id. at 1165-67. "SAM presents no evidence that Knoedler defrauded the museum. In
particular, there is no evidence SAM relied upon anything Knoedler ever said about
L'Odalisque's title." Id. at 1166.
264. Rosenberg v. Seattle Art Museum, 124 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1207 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
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argued by the museum,265 it took the liberty of recognizing a fourth
issue regarding assignment of the fraud claim to the museum by the
Bloedel heirs after the previous judgment had been entered. 266 Fol-
lowing the grant of the gallery's motion for summary judgment in
1999, the Bloedel heirs assigned their fraud claim against the gallery
to the museum.267 Thus, although the museum did not have standing
at the time summary judgment was entered, it subsequently acquired
it.268 Despite the res judicata issue,269 the court held that "[n]ow that
the [a]ssignment has been made, the Court finds that, as a matter of
equity, SAM should be permitted its day in court so that this case may
be disposed of on its merits. ' 270 Therefore, in light of the assignment,
the court acknowledged that there were new facts before the court
that warranted vacating the judgment and reconsidering the case on
its merits.271
265. Id. at 1208. The museum argued that three errors warranted reconsideration by the
court. First, the court failed to look at the language of the will and trust instrument, by which the
Bloedels had bequeathed the painting to SAM. id. Second, the court misunderstood the role
and enforceability of the agreement pursuant to the law of the State of Washington. Id. Third,
the museum argued that the court lacked proper jurisdiction to overrule the conclusions reached
in the previous agreements. Id. Regarding the first alleged error, the court responded simply by
saying the language of the will did not say what SAM thought it did. Id. at 1209. Regarding the
second alleged error, the court held that RCW 11.96.170 was inapplicable because this dispute
did not arise out of the administration of the Bloedel estate. Id. Instead, the court noted that
SAM received title to the painting only, therefore, SAM's interest in the administration of the
Bloedel estate became complete when it took possession of the painting. Rosenberg, 124 F.
Supp. 2d at 1209. Finally, regarding the third alleged error, the court stated "SAM cannot argue
that the agreement conclusively resolves the issue before the court, and at the same time argue
that this court has no jurisdiction to assess the validity ... of the argument." Id. at 1209.
266. Id. at 1208.
267. Id. at 1209.
268. Id. at 1209-1210.
269. As SAM did not have standing at the time summary judgment was granted, but had since
obtained standing, the court noted that a res judicata issue might arise if SAM were allowed to
reassert its original claim in a new lawsuit. Id. at 1210.
270. Rosenberg, 124 F. Supp. 2d at 1210.
271. Id. The court further held, however, that SAM was required to pay all of Knoedler's
costs associated with this motion because SAM's failure to obtain the assignment before the
summary judgment determination created unnecessary litigation costs for Knoedler. Id. In Oc-
tober of 2000, SAM and the Knoedler Gallery reached an out-of-court settlement in which
Knoedler agreed to reimburse the museum for the loss of the painting. See Regina Hackett, Art
Museum Settles Suit Over a Stolen Matisse, SEAYFLE Posr, Oct. 17, 2000, available at http://
museum-security.org. Mimi Gates, Director of SAM, would not specify an exact dollar amount
but stated: "we are being reimbursed for our legal fees, research and travel costs as well as the
loss of the painting." Id. The Knoedler Gallery was reported to be satisfied with the settlement
as well. Id.
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III. ANALYSIS
The above cases represent the types of issues and analyses currently
raised to address World War II looted art claims. In general, the
courts seem to favor the replevin doctrine.272 However, some courts
have indicated that other legal theories might also be as applicable to
claims involving looted art,273 such as the doctrines of fraudulent con-
cealment or conversion. 27 4 In general, these various legal doctrines
have a number of strengths and shortcomings that must be addressed.
Additionally, courts are split on whether the demand and refusal rule
or the discovery rule should be applied to determine when the statute
of limitations begins to accrue. Therefore, it is also necessary to dis-
cuss these competing rules in order to decide which rule most effec-
tively addresses the unique problems surrounding claims for the
recovery of World War II looted art in a more equitable manner.
A. Rights of a Current Possessor of Stolen Property Under the
Doctrine of Adverse Possession
Traditionally, claims for the recovery of stolen personal property
were brought under the doctrine of adverse possession. 275 The doc-
trine of adverse possession allows the current possessor of a piece of
property to obtain good title, despite the fact that possession was ini-
tially wrongful as against the true owner.276 In order to obtain good
title under the doctrine of adverse possession, five elements must be
satisfied. 277 The possession must be open and notorious, exclusive,
continuous, actual, and under a claim of right.278 Further, before the
adverse possession of a piece of property can mature into rightful
ownership, possession must continue until after the statute of limita-
tions period has expired, effectively barring any future lawsuits. 2 79
As one author noted,
Before rewarding good title to a possessor of stolen property under
the doctrine of adverse possession, . .. courts generally required
272. See DeWeerth, 658 F. Supp. at 688; Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus,
717 F. Supp. 1374 (S.D. Ind. 1989); Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 426.
273. See Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. 1374 (discussing the doctrines of replevin, fraudulent
concealment, conversion, and equitable estoppel).
274. Id.
275. Marilyn E. Phelan, Scope of Due Diligence Investigation in Obtaining Title to Valuable
Artwork, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 631, 654 (2000).
276. Id.
277. DeWeerth, 658 F. Supp. at 697.
278. Id. Courts have generally held that the mere residential display of a piece of artwork
does not constitute the required open and notorious elements necessary to afford to the true
owner. Id.
279. See Phelan, supra note 275, at 654.
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three conditions: (1) honesty on the part of the purchaser; (2) open
use by him for the statutory period; and (3) failure on the part of the
owner to take reasonable steps to secure his rights. 280
In this way, the doctrine of adverse possession tended to favor the
possessors of stolen property 28 1 and failed to treat theft victims in an
equitable manner. As one scholar noted, "[C]ourts [often] permitted
the ownership rights of theft victims to be expunged, even when they
lacked constructive notice of rival claims, in order to protect the rea-
sonable commercial expectations of buyers and to provide a way for
title to be made secure in the marketplace. 2182
Fortunately, as time passed, the courts found that by supplanting
the doctrine of adverse possession with other legal doctrines, equita-
ble considerations in stolen art cases could be considered more can-
didly and "results more compatible with declared public policy goals"
could be achieved. 283 In other words, by abandoning the doctrine of
adverse possession, the courts were finally able to focus on the legiti-
macy of the plaintiff's claim, instead of on the good faith behavior of
the current possessor.
B. Original Owners' Burden of Proof Under the Doctrine
of Replevin
According to the common law, replevin is the proper legal theory
for the recovery of personal property. 284 As the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit described it, replevin is "an action
at law 'whereby the owner or person claiming the possession of per-
sonal goods may recover such personal goods where they have been
wrongfully taken or unlawfully detained." 285 In other words, "[t]he
gist of the action is the defendant's unlawful detention of the plain-
tiff's property. '286 The issue is always whether the opposing party can
prevent the claimant's right to possession.287 The purpose of the ac-
tion is "to determine whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to the
possession of the property, and it is not the purpose to determine
whether the plaintiff is the owner of the property. 2
88
280. Id. at 655 (quoting R.H. Helmolz, Wrongful Possession of Chattels: Hornbook Law and
Case Law, 80 N.w. U. L. REV. 1221, 1236 (1986)).
281. Id. at 655.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 656.
284. Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1395.
285. Autocephalous, 917 F.2d at 290 (quoting 25 I.L.E. Replevin §1).
286. Id.
287. Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1395-96.
288. Id. at 1396 n.17.
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Three elements must be satisfied in order for a plaintiff to recover
property under the doctrine of replevin.28 9 First, a plaintiff must
prove that she has title to or the right to possession of the property.2 90
In order to satisfy the first element, a plaintiff must show the strength
of her own title; she may not simply prove the weakness of the defen-
dant's title.2 91 Second, a plaintiff must show that the property she
seeks to reclaim is being unlawfully or wrongfully detained.2 92 The
second element can be satisfied by showing that the plaintiff never
intended to relinquish title or possession, nor did she abandon the
property, but rather the property was removed without the plaintiff's
permission or authorization.2 93 In order to satisfy the third element of
replevin, the plaintiff must show that the defendant is in wrongful pos-
session of the property.2 94 According to the law of replevin, a thief
does not obtain the title to or the right to possession of stolen prop-
erty; therefore, a thief cannot pass good title or the right to possession
of stolen property to a subsequent purchaser. 295 In this way, the third
element of replevin is satisfied merely by showing that the property
was stolen.296
While the doctrine of replevin may be applicable to most cases,
problems can arise in the context of World War II looted art claims.
The doctrine of replevin places the burden of making and proving the
claim on the victim. 297 However, due to the fact that many of today's
claimants are heirs to the original owners and much time has passed
since the works of art first disappeared, proof of good title or the right
to possession is not easily shown in many cases.2 98 In addition, the
doctrine of replevin assumes that the original owners of the property
or their heirs are aware of what they own and exactly when it became
missing; however, specific details such as these were often lost during
the war or over the passage of time.299 Given the unusual nature of
289. Autocephalous, 917 F.2d at 290.
290. Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1397.
291. Id. at 1397.
292. Id. at 1397-98.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 1396-97.
295. Id. at 1376.
296. Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1398.
297. Barbara J. Tyler, The Stolen Museum: Have United States Art Museums Become Inadver-
tent Fences for Stolen Art Works Looted by the Nazis in World War 11?, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 441, 456
(1999).
298. See infra notes 356-357 and accompanying text (describing the difficulties faced by heirs
of the original owners in locating stolen works of art).
299. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text (explaining how disorganization and the
absence of a uniform policy led to the disappearance of many artworks at the end of and imme-
diately following World War II).
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the World War II looted art claims, it has become necessary to search
for alternative legal theories that do not place such a high burden of
proof on the victims.
C. Rights of Original Owners Under the Doctrine of
Fraudulent Concealment
Fraudulent concealment is another doctrine that could be applied to
cases involving claims for the recovery of looted or stolen art. Fraudu-
lent concealment occurs when a defendant has, by deceit or fraud,
prevented a potential plaintiff from learning of a cause of action until
after the statute of limitations period has expired. 300 In order to apply
this doctrine, the defendant must have actively and intentionally con-
cealed the property so that the plaintiff's inquiry or investigation, al-
though duly diligent, was hindered.301 As noted by Judge Richard D.
Cudahy's concurrence in the Autocephalous appeal, "whenever the
possessor of lost or stolen personal property commits 'fraud in the
concealment,' the statute of limitations does not run against the origi-
nal owner until that owner has actual knowledge of the location of the
property and of the identity of the possessor. '302 In other words, a
defendant who is held to have fraudulently concealed some property
from its true owner cannot benefit from the defense of the statute of
limitations.303
While the doctrine of fraudulent concealment may do a slightly bet-
ter job of shielding victims of stolen art from the statute of limitations,
like the doctrine of replevin, it assumes too much. The doctrine of
fraudulent concealment assumes that original owners of looted or sto-
len art, or their heirs, are aware of what they once owned, know that it
was missing as a result of the wrongful conduct of another party, know
when it was first missing, and so on.30 4 In this way, the doctrine of
fraudulent concealment places the burden on the true owner to show
not only that he exercised due diligence in locating the stolen artwork
and bringing the claim but also that the defendant acted fraudulently
in concealing the artwork's whereabouts. 30 5 Again, this is too high a
burden for the true owners to bear because it does not take into ac-
count the fact that much of the information necessary to make a claim
300. Autocephalous, 917 F.2d at 288.
301. Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1387 (emphasis added).
302. Autocephalous, 917 F.2d at 294 (Cudahy, J., concurring).
303. Id. at 288.
304. See Tyler, supra note 297, at 460-61.
305. See Sherlock, infra note 322, at 498-503 (discussing how the burdens of exercising due
diligence to locate the stolen artwork and proving that the artwork has been concealed are both
on the plaintiff).
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is unknown to the potential claimant. 30 6 Sometimes, the relevant in-
formation is missing or classified. 30 7 Sometimes, the details did not
endure the passage of time or survive the displacement and destruc-
tion that took place during World War II. In many cases, however,
artwork is purposefully concealed because the possessor's sole con-
cern is keeping others from discovering the work's location. For these
reasons, it is necessary to continue exploring alternative legal theories.
D. The Possibility of Collecting Money Damages Under the
Doctrine of Conversion
Another possibility for those attempting to recover stolen art is the
doctrine of conversion. The "tort of conversion" is "the wrongful in-
vasion of a right to, and absolute dominion over property owned or
controlled by the person deprived thereof, or of its use and benefit.
... "38 The main difference between an action in conversion and an
action in replevin is that with an action in conversion, the claimant
requests money damages for the value of the stolen property, whereas
with an action in replevin, the claimant seeks the return of the prop-
erty itself.30 9
The elements, however, are quite similar under both doctrines: the
claimant must prove that she had both valid title and the right to pos-
session of the property before or at the time of conversion and that
the current possessor wrongfully converted the property for his own
use.310 The argument that the purchaser acted in good faith without
knowledge that the transaction was "unlawful, improper, or unautho-
rized" 311, is no defense to conversion; yet once again, the burden of
proving rightful ownership and possession is on the victim. 312 And
again, placing the burden of making and proving the claim on the vic-
tim is too high a burden to bear.
As previously discussed in relation to the doctrines of replevin and
fraudulent concealment, the doctrine of conversion assumes that the
original owners of the artwork or their heirs are aware of what was
306. See infra notes 356-357 (describing the difficulties faced by heirs of the original owners in
locating stolen artworks).
307. See supra notes 55-62 (describing the state of affairs at the end of World War II and
during the Cold War).
308. Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1399 n.23.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Phelan, supra note 275, at 648.
312. Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1399 n.23 (discussing how the plaintiff has the burden of
proving the elements of conversion).
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owned and when it became missing.313 It fails to take into account the
passage of time and the fact that so many people and things were dis-
placed during and immediately following World War II. 314
While the legal doctrines are all equally imperfect, none of the
mechanisms used to bring the claims have proven to be as important
as the statute of limitations rules to be employed to balance the equi-
ties of the parties. In making that determination, a key issue is
whether and to what degree the due diligence or reasonable diligence
standard applies.
E. When Should the Statute of Limitations Begin to Accrue: Two
Competing Theories
When a claim is brought for the recovery of stolen art, be it through
an action in replevin, fraudulent concealment, or conversion, there ex-
ists a separate issue regarding when the statute of limitations begins to
run. The two rules traditionally applied by the courts are the discov-
ery rule and the demand and refusal rule.
1. The Discovery Rule: The Statute of Limitations Does Not Begin
to Run Until the Current Location and Identity of the
Possessor Are "Discovered"
The discovery rule states that a plaintiff's "cause of action accrue[s]
when she first knew, or reasonably should have known through the
exercise of due diligence, of the cause of action, including the identity
of the possessor of the paintings. '315 Stated differently, the discovery
rule dictates that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until
the date that a plaintiff knew or should have known, via due diligence,
that she has suffered an injury and that it was caused by the specific
act of another. 316 In this way, the discovery rule prevents the statute
of limitations from beginning to run in situations where a would-be
plaintiff cannot bring suit because he cannot determine a cause of ac-
tion or identify a specific defendant, despite duly diligent efforts. 317
As stated by the Seventh Circuit in Autocephalous, "[I]n the context
of a replevin action for particular, unique ... works of art, a plaintiff
cannot be said to have 'discovered' his cause of action until he learns
313. See infra notes 356-357 (describing the difficulties faced by heirs of the original owners in
locating stolen artworks).
314. See supra notes 55-62 (describing the state of affairs at the end of World War II and
during the Cold War).
315. Autocephalous, 717 F. Supp. at 1388.
316. Id. at 1386.
317. Id. at 1389.
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enough facts to form its basis, which must include the fact that the
works are being held by another and who, or at least where, that
'other' is. ' '318
Some have argued that the discovery rule is a "good compromise in
that it recognizes that original owners can be truly unaware of where
their art is located, [while it] also recognizes the need for repose for
the purchaser."' 3 9 In theory, "[t]he discovery rule allows the court to
consider all aspects of a case relevant to the determination of accrual,
and to arrive at a result that is fair and consistent with the statute of
limitations' policy goals." 320
In practice, however, the discovery rule imposes much too high a
burden on the true owner. In deciding whether or not discovery was
unreasonably delayed, courts employ a subjective, fact-sensitive test
on a case-by-case basis with results that can vary widely from case to
case and court to court.321 The discovery rule shifts the focus from the
current possessor's conduct to the conduct of the true owner in
searching for the missing property.322 The discovery rule focuses its
inquiry on whether the true owner conducted a duly diligent search
for the missing artwork, and it fails to consider whether the current
possessor acted in good faith by conducting his or her own inquiry
into the artwork's legal title.323
In this way, the discovery rule is inequitable and unfair as it applies
to victims of World War II art looting. By applying the discovery rule,
courts allow current possessors to quietly retain title while true own-
ers' search efforts are unfairly scrutinized. Further, courts often fail to
take into account all of the unique circumstances surrounding World
War II claims that make "discovering" an artwork's whereabouts so
difficult. 324 Many of the original owners are no longer living and their
heirs are often unaware of what is missing.325 Even in cases where
original owners or their heirs are actively searching for the missing
artwork, they are often at a disadvantage because much of the neces-
318. Autocephalous, 917 F.2d at 289.
319. Walton, supra note 19, at 597.
320. Phelan, supra note 275, at 649.
321. Walton, supra note 19, at 599.
322. Meghan A. Sherlock, Comment, A Combined Discovery Rule and Demand and Refusal
Rule for New York: The Need for Equitable Consistency in International Cases of Recovery of
Stolen Art and Cultural Property, 8 TUL. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 483, 498 (2000).
323. Autocephalous, 917 F.2d at 294-95.
324. See supra notes 55-62 (describing the state of affairs at the end of World War II and
during the Cold War).
325. See infra notes 356-357 (describing the difficulties faced by heirs of the original owners in
locating stolen artwork).
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sary information is missing or classified. 326 Though the discovery rule
purports to take into account whether or not a plaintiff has been duly
diligent in his or her search efforts, the fact remains that all of the due
diligence in the world cannot locate a work of art when there is no
information available regarding its whereabouts. For this reason, an
alternative rule is necessary.
2. The Demand and Refusal Rule: The Statute of Limitations Does
Not Begin to Run Until the Original Owner Demands Its
Return and the Current Possessor Refuses
The only existing alternative to the discovery rule in the stolen art
context is the demand and refusal rule. The demand and refusal rule
applies to cases where an owner brings a cause of action against one
who innocently purchases stolen property in good faith. 327 The de-
mand and refusal rule states that "the limitations period begins to run
only when the owner demands return of the property and the pur-
chaser refuses. '328 In contrast to cases where the action is against the
thief himself and the statute of limitations begins to run the moment
the property is stolen, 329 the demand and refusal rule implies that an
innocent purchaser of stolen goods becomes a wrongdoer only after
refusing the true owner's demand for their return. 330 In other words,
until a demand is made for the return of a piece of stolen property, the
good faith purchaser is considered to be in lawful possession. 331
As one author noted, "[T]he demand and refusal rule . . . is the
soundest policy yet applied in stolen art cases. This doctrine best bal-
ances the respective rights of the parties and delegates most equitably
the obligations of both innocent purchasers and true owners. '332
While some commentators criticize the rule, arguing that it allows true
owners to "sleep on their rights" without consequence, proponents ar-
gue that it favors the true owner by not barring her claim before she
has a chance to discover her artwork's whereabouts and demand that
the work be returned.333 Further, the demand and refusal rule en-
courages purchasers of fine art to ask more questions and proceed
326. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
327. Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 1161.
328. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 429.
329. Id.
330. Elicofon, 678 F.2d at 1161.
331. Id.
332. Phelan, supra note 275, at 646 (quoting Andrea E. Hayworth, Note, Stolen Artwork: De-
ciding Ownership is No Pretty Picture, 43 DUKE L.J. 337, 374 (1993)).
333. Walton, supra note 19, at 597.
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more cautiously in their transactions. 334 In fact, some argue that while
the demand and refusal rule favors the true owner of stolen art, it also
benefits the current possessor in that it gives those who are in mis-
taken possession of stolen property an opportunity to rectify their
good faith mistakes before demand is made and they incur legal liabil-
ity.335 Though the demand and refusal rule is the superior of the two
rules in terms of its treatment of the true owners of stolen art, the
discussion does not end here. On the contrary, the additional ques-
tion of due diligence must be addressed.
3. The Question of Due Diligence
Despite some courts' general preference for the demand and refusal
rule, there exists a much-debated second issue regarding whether, and
in what way, the due diligence standard applies. In addition to requir-
ing that the true owner demand that the artwork be returned and the
current possessor refuse the demand before the statute of limitations
period begins to run, many courts impose an additional duty of rea-
sonable diligence on the true owner in attempting to locate the stolen
property.336
Noting the "absence of controlling state authority," the DeWeerth
court was the first to predict that a state court "would impose a duty
of reasonable diligence in attempting to locate stolen property, in ad-
dition to the undisputed duty to make a demand for return within a
reasonable time after the current possessor is identified. '337 The basis
for the DeWeerth court's prediction was that a rule requiring reasona-
ble diligence protects the good faith purchaser. 338 The court reasoned
that while a thief would be immune to a lawsuit after three years,
measured from the time of the occurrence of the theft, without the
additional duty of reasonable diligence, a good faith purchaser "would
remain exposed as long as his identity did not fortuitously come to the
property owner's attention. '339 By imposing a rule that prevents an
owner from unreasonably delaying his demand and, therefore, stalling
the running of the statute of limitations, 340 "DeWeerth endeavor[ed]
'to mitigate the inequity . . .' by extending the unreasonable delay
rule, heretofore held applicable only in situations where the plaintiff
ha[d] actual knowledge of the facts necessary to make a demand
334. Id. at 598.
335. See Phelan, supra note 275, at 641.
336. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 108.
337. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 429.
338. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 109.
339. Id. at 108-09.
340. DeWeerth, 658 F. Supp. at 694.
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.... "341 Stated differently, "[t]he theory is that if delay in making a
demand with knowledge of the whereabouts of stolen property is rele-
vant in determining the timeliness of a replevin action, delay should
also be relevant if the whereabouts of stolen property could have been
known with a reasonably diligent search. '342 In sum, many courts
now require not only that the return of property be demanded and
refused, but also consider whether the demand could have been made
earlier if the true owner had conducted a reasonably diligent
search. 343
Despite the stated justifications for the additional duty of reasona-
ble diligence, many courts have rejected it based on policy considera-
tions.344 As one court stated, "[l]t would not be prudent to extend
th[e] case law and impose the additional duty of [reasonable] diligence
before the true owner has reason to know where its missing chattel is
to be found. ' 345 Courts have noted the difficulty of designing a rea-
sonable diligence requirement that would not place an undue burden
on the true owner of stolen art 346 and have further stated that "[t]o
place the burden of locating stolen artwork on the true owner and to
foreclose the rights of that owner to recover its property if the burden
is not met would . . . encourage illicit trafficking in stolen art. '347
These courts agree that the demand and refusal rule by itself is "the
better rule [because it] gives the owner relatively greater protection
[by] plac[ing] the burden of investigating the provenance of a work of
art on the potential purchaser. '348 Nevertheless, courts have failed to
apply the demand and refusal rule, or any of the legal doctrines, in a
uniform manner to all World War II looted art cases. 349
F. Judicial Solutions Have Failed to Create a Uniform
Common Law
Courts need to develop a common law that creates "an environ-
ment more protective of original owners. '350 Better rules need to be
created and applied consistently in order to eliminate confusion and
341. Guggenheim, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
342. Id. at 620-621.
343. Id. at 621.
344. DeWeerth, 804 F. Supp. at 548.
345. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 430.
346. Id. at 431.
347. DeWeerth, 804 F. Supp. at 548.
348. Guggenheim, 569 N.E.2d at 431.
349. See supra notes 64-271 and accompanying text (explaining the application of the various
doctrines to cases involving claims for the return of stolen artwork).
350. See Sherlock, supra note 322, at 498.
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to aid in making those involved in the art world more aware of their
rights and responsibilities. As one author noted, "[B]ecause of the
myriad impediments art theft victims confront in seeking to locate and
recover their stolen property [and also because of] the greater re-
sources and access to information that collectors of valuable art ob-
jects typically enjoy," courts should continue to make honesty and
good faith on the part of the current possessor of art a pivotal
consideration. 351
Despite these noble goals, the fact remains that courts have largely
failed the true owners who have brought claims for the recovery of
their World War II looted art. Beyond the fact that some individual
plaintiffs have been victorious in their claims while others have been
wrongfully denied recovery, the larger problem, and the one faced by
all true owners, is the fact that the courts have not developed a clear
rule for handling these claims. Plaintiffs are left to gamble with their
rights when seeking legal redress for the indisputably wrongful acts of
wartime looting. For this reason, alternative solutions must be
explored.
IV. IMPACT
As discussed above, the courts have mainly relied on the doctrine of
replevin in deciding claims for the return of looted or stolen art.
Nonetheless, other theories, such as the doctrines of fraudulent con-
cealment and conversion, are applicable. The courts are also divided
over whether the discovery rule or the demand and refusal rule should
apply to claims involving stolen art and to what degree due (or rea-
sonable) diligence should apply. Regardless of which doctrines or
standards apply, however, the courts have taken for granted that the
triple burden of locating the stolen artwork, bringing suit to recover it,
and proving title or right to possession rests squarely on the shoulders
of the claimants. This burden seems particularly unreasonable where
claims involve art that was looted during or immediately following
World War II.
A. The Burdens on True, Prewar Owners Are Too High to Bear
As one author noted, "[I]f the law takes into account who has a
stronger moral claim.., few would argue against a conception that all
victims of art theft, but especially Holocaust victims and their heirs,
have the stronger moral claim. '352 The seizing of Jewish art was part
351. Phelan, supra note 275, at 656-57.
352. Walton, supra note 19, at 600.
1146 [Vol. 51:1103
THE LAST PRISONERS OF WAR
of a "process of persecution, dehumanization, and eventual annihila-
tion" on the part of Hitler and the Nazis.353 As one scholar noted,
[T]his inextricable link between the Holocaust and art looted by the
Nazis during World War 1I creates a moral obligation to help survi-
vors of the Holocaust, the heirs of those who perished, and any vic-
tims of Nazi looting, to recover stolen artwork. This moral
obligation surpasses any black letter law to the contrary.354
Indeed, while the lives that were lost at the hands of the Nazis are
irrevocably lost, with some effort, looted art could still be returned to
its original owners or their heirs.355
Today, most of the original owners of World War II looted art are
either deceased or extremely elderly. Consequently, the burden of lo-
cating the missing artworks is often placed on their heirs, many of who
have no firsthand knowledge of either the artwork itself or their rela-
tive's wartime experience. Indeed, it is reasonable to believe that
many second and third generation heirs are entirely unaware of what
their ancestors once owned and the legal rights and responsibilities
that are attached to it. Though, as one author noted, "[T]he law ... is
highly favorable towards any original owner who can demonstrate
ownership";356 this author ignores the fact that demonstrating owner-
ship after locating the missing artwork and filing a legal claim to re-
cover it is one of the factors that makes recovery such an impossible
task in the first place. 357
Another burden facing true owners is the staggering cost of litiga-
tion. 358 Experts estimate that it may cost as much as $100,000 just to
initiate litigation.35 9 Indeed, it has been suggested that if the artwork
in question is worth less than $3 million, it is often more economical to
simply give the piece up than it is to pursue litigation because it is
353. Cuba, supra note 1, at 470 (quoting JONATHAN PETROPOULOS, ART AS POLITICS IN THE
THIRD REICH 123 (1996)). Put differently, "[t]he Nazis' policy of looting art was a critical ele-
ment and incentive in their campaign of genocide against individuals of Jewish and other relig-
ious and cultural heritages." Id. at 469 (quoting Holocaust Victims Redress Act, Pub. L. No.
105-158, § 201, 112 Stat. 15, 17 (1998)).
354. Cuba, supra note 1, at 469.
355. See Falconer, supra note 18, at 396. This author suggests that "[t]he restitution of this art
... might bring about a long-delayed symbolic victory for the victims of the Holocaust." Id.
356. Turner, supra note 23, at 1548 (emphasis added).
357. "After an artwork is stolen, theft victims frequently encounter severe obstacles in trying
to locate and reclaim their property." Phelan, supra note 275, at 671. See also Tyler, supra note
297, at 455 (noting that most problems for the recovery of art looted by the Nazis arise in at-
tempting to prove true ownership).
358. One author noted that plaintiffs "face huge litigation costs and severe evidentiary bur-
dens in proving that they own the artworks they claim to own, and many valid claims will never
be litigated simply because of these burdens." Turner, supra note 23, at 1547.
359. Tyler, supra note 297, at 444-45.
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likely that the costs of litigation will outweigh the value of the artwork
itself.360 When you compare the position of the current possessor,
often large institutions, successful art dealers, or wealthy private col-
lectors, to the financial situations of World War II survivors or their
second and third generation heirs, it seems even more unfair to place
the full burden of litigating and proving the claim on the true
owners.
36
'
Moreover, potential plaintiffs face many other obstacles in their
quest to recover World War II looted art. First, by their unique na-
ture, artworks "are easy to transport and easy to conceal. '362 Art, by
virtue of the way the art market operates, is very difficult to trace.363
It is bought and sold privately or transferred between multiple genera-
tions via inheritance as often as it is put up for public sale or display.
In this way, it travels easily across borders. As one author put it, "[I]n
light of [the] hypermobility [of artworks], it is unsurprising that theft
victims often cannot even imagine where to begin looking for their
missing property. '364
Further, true owners of artworks that were looted during World
War II face the daunting task of "searching a global market that trades
in commodities with histories about which many of the traders are
willfully ignorant. '365 Because the Nazis highly undervalued modern
and impressionist art, they sometimes exchanged several valuable
paintings by Picasso or Monet for a single mediocre painting by a Ger-
man or Germanic artist.366 As a result, for "those with art to sell or
with money to spend ... the Nazi art market provided incredible op-
portunities. ' 367 Many art dealers were eager to profit from the Nazi
360. Id.
361. See Phelan, supra note 275, at 696.
362. Id. at 671.
363. See Tyler, supra note 297, at 466 n.185 (quoting Ronald Lauder, Chairman of the Comis-
sion for Art Recovery of the World Jewish Congress, testifying before the Holocaust Assets
Commission, Dec. 12, 1998). Lauder stated,
I ask this Committee . . . to appreciate the many ways in which works of [art] differ
from other assets. Art moves in ways that are often very difficult to trace. It is bought
and sold privately at least as often as it passes through public sales. When it is inherited
and given within families, it may not surface for several generations. Art travels easily
across borders.
Id.
364. Id. See also Tyler, supra note 297, at 460 n. 138 (arguing that the difficulty is not in discov-
ering the existence of the property but in pin-pointing the existence of the property in the hands
of another).
365. Phelan, supra note 275, at 671 (referring to the "ask no questions" commercial conven-
tions of the international art market).
366. Turner, supra note 23, at 1517.
367. Id. at 1517-18.
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sales of "degenerate art" and most knew exactly where the art was
coming from.368 As one author explained,
[D]isreputable and reputable characters alike figure in the massive
amount of trading that occurred during and after the war. Dealers
from many countries, eager to buy works at low prices, cared little
for provenance information. Those sympathetic or indifferent to
the Nazis did not think twice about accepting or buying art known
to be stolen from Jews and others. 369
Even today, those involved in the art trade are notoriously negli-
gent in checking the provenance 370 and title of artworks.371 Museums,
auction houses, and art dealers admit that "the ordinary custom in the
art business is not to inquire as to title [because] a duty of inquiry
would cripple the art business. ... "372 In general, auction houses and
art dealers neither inquire into an artwork's provenance nor reveal
the information that is known regarding a work's provenance or title
to potential buyers. 373 Likewise, it is a common practice among muse-
ums to ignore the origins of donated works.374 As one expert involved
in the quest to prevent trade in stolen art commented, "[T]his is the
only business enterprise in the world where people spend tens of
thousands to millions of dollars without doing any proper investiga-
tion. '375 However, until there is an incentive or legal duty to do oth-
erwise, those involved in the art industry will continue to ignore title
information. 376
An additional impediment to the recovery of stolen or looted art is
the fact that no clear procedure exists by which true owners may con-
duct an investigation. 377 As one author noted, "[T]he fragmentary
and little known mechanisms by which an original owner could report
368. Walton, supra note 19, at 563.
369. Id. at 567.
370. "Provenance is a technical art world term meaning documentation of origin or history of
ownership. It is not exactly interchangeable with legal title, but if properly determined, should
reveal ... who owned the art ... and where the art has been." Walton, supra note 19, at 551-552.
371. Cuba, supra note 1, at 465.
372. Id. (quoting Porter v. Wertz, 421 N.E.2d 500, 502 (N.Y. 1981)).
373. See Walton, supra note 19, at 567. It has been noted that auction houses do not bother to
inquire into the provenance or title of artworks that have been consigned to them because they
see themselves as mere middlemen in art transactions. Cuba, supra note 1, at 466.
374. See Cuba, supra note 1, at 466.
375. Walton, supra note 19, at 567 (quoting Joshua J. Kaufman in Walter v. Robinson, An
Ignominous Legacy; Evidence Grows of Plundered Art in U.S., BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 5, 1997, at
At.
376. See Cuba, supra note 1, at 468.
377. See Walton, supra note 19, at 599. The author states that there is no "unified process or
checklist of steps" regarding the manner in which a valid owner can or should notify the art
world that an artwork is missing. Id.
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and search for stolen art are inadequate to provide a standard. '378
Further, even if a clear standard did exist, many works of art are dis-
played only privately in the homes of current possessors and therefore
these works continue to be shielded from public scrutiny.37 9 As a re-
sult, the establishment of a clear standard or international system is
not the answer. Instead, the responsibility for clearing title and estab-
lishing right to possession should rest with the current or potential
purchasers of valuable artworks.
B. Placing the Burden of Proving Good Title on Current and
Potential Possessors Is a More Equitable Solution
As one author noted, those who purchase and collect valuable art
acquire materials voluntarily. They are either tax-exempt institu-
tions with an abundance of art world expertise and access to infor-
mation and sophistication or they are private collectors who are
sufficiently wealthy to afford these resources. They have time to
consider their prospective acquisitions and to conduct investigations
before making decisions. The wealth and ... resources that buyers
•.. of expensive works necessarily enjoy .... recommend that courts
impose an investigative standard upon buyers and collectors .... 380
In comparing the status of the involuntary art theft victim to the status
of the wealthy and sophisticated voluntary buyer and collector of val-
uable art, the legal burden for establishing good title and right to pos-
session by the showing of a due diligence investigation is most just
when it rests on the latter's shoulders.
Further, requiring current and potential possessors of art to conduct
due diligence investigations has public policy benefits beyond putting
true owners of art looted during World War II in a more equitable
position. Not only does a due diligence investigation safeguard the
rights of theft victims, it also discourages trafficking in stolen art, en-
courages the development of resources and tools for locating stolen
art, creates a title-clearing mechanism for the United States art mar-
ket, and protects the moral and ethical positions and reputations of
buyers and collectors of valuable art.38'
"[P]ersons who have acquired stolen artworks without first investi-
gating their backgrounds are, at a minimum, reckless. '382 This is be-
cause those involved in the art industry know, or should know, that
378. Phelan, supra note 275, at 671-672 (quoting Sydney M. Drum, DeWeerth v. Baldinger:
Making New York a Haven for Stolen Art?, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 909, 941 (1989)).
379. See Phelan, supra note 275, at 672.
380. Id. at 696.
381. Id. at 728-30.
382. Id. at 653.
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the market is flooded with stolen works of art and subsequent claims
for recovery. Indeed, anyone involved in the art market knows that,
regardless of whether suspicious circumstances surround a particular
piece of art, without taking documented due diligence "precautions,
persons found in mistaken possession of stolen art cannot be assured
of defeating, under the 'balance of equities' judicial criterion, future
potential lawsuits that former owners may bring to recover the art. '383
Further, the fact that courts have generally held that those who have
not been duly diligent should continue to be exposed to potential
claims indefinitely384 should serve as an incentive for being prepared
to show that a documented 385 due diligence investigation into the art-
work's title and provenance was conducted. 38 6 As a result, due dili-
gence investigation is as much a necessity for current and potential
purchasers to protect their own interests, as it is a balancing of the
equities in favor of the true owners.
Finally, "[d]ue to their intimate knowledge and extensive resources,
entities and individuals in the art industry should be held to a higher
standard of good faith in their dealings and investigations of title. '387
Indeed, when one considers the fact that current and potential owners
of valuable art have at their fingertips the resources necessary to con-
duct due diligence investigations, "[p]ossesssors of stolen materials
who have not ... conducted [due diligence] investigations cannot be
considered 'innocent' or 'good-faith' [in the eyes of the court]." 388
Moreover, in a market where thousands of works of art are still miss-
ing and waiting to be claimed, it is in the best interest of current and
potential possessors to establish good title for artworks already in
their possession and to refuse to take possession of works of art unless
and until the seller can provide good title.38 9 As is the case with all
other major purchases, especially those involving real property, it is
customary for purchasers to protect themselves either by conducting
their own search and establishing good title or by insisting that the
383. Id. at 658.
384. See Phelan, supra note 275, at 657.
385. Id. at 727 (stating that all due diligence investigations should be documented to be
effective).
386. Walton, supra note 19, at 600.
387. Phelan, supra note 275, at 673 (quoting Maritza F. Bolano, International Art Theft Dis-
putes: Harmonizing Common Law Principles with Article 7(b) of the UNESCO Convention, 15
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 129, 163-64 (1991/1992)).
388. Phelan, supra note 275, at 657.
389. Cuba, supra note 1, at 468. As one author noted, current and potential purchasers of fine
art must "realize that the short-term benefit of ignoring questionable title is outweighed by the
long-term repercussions of legal hassles and poor publicity." Id.
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seller provide proof of good title upon purchase. 390 Likewise, owners
of art should be required "to assure themselves and others that their
possession is legitimate and lawful." '39'
In sum, it is more equitable to place the burden of proving good
title and right to possession on the shoulders of those who purchase
and possess valuable art, for these institutions and individuals, by vir-
tue of the fact that they are dealing in the art market, have the neces-
sary connections, resources, and wealth to conduct due diligent
searches. On the contrary, true owners and their heirs are at a com-
plete disadvantage for a myriad of reasons, not the least of which is
that these people have already had to survive the ravages of World
War II. It is for this reason, as well as for those reasons discussed
above, that both legal and moral justice require shifting the burden
onto the shoulders of those who purchase and possess art.
C. Existing Solutions and Resolutions Are Unworkable as Applied
to the Victims of World War H Art Looting
Because the problems related to claims for the recovery of World
War II looted art are vast, a number of solutions have already been
offered. One author has suggested the creation of an official, interna-
tional website on the Internet for documenting all lost artworks and
cultural property "where stolen artworks are arranged by type (i.e.,
masks, paintings, sculpture, religious icons, etc.); [and] within each
type ... the pieces [are arranged] by geographic location, culture and
collection. ' 392 This author argued that good faith purchasers have a
duty to insist that legitimate sellers provide them with an Internet re-
port detailing a work of art's provenance.3 93 However, the due dili-
gence burden of immediately reporting the missing art to the police
and, in turn, to the Internet website, remains on the true owner.394
This solution is unworkable as applied to the victims of World War
II art theft because the initial burden of discovering that the artwork
is missing, as well as the burden of reporting the loss to the authori-
ties, remains on the true owners or their heirs. As previously dis-
cussed in the context of art that was looted during World War II,
placing the burden on true owners assumes that potential claimants,
or their heirs, are aware of not only what is missing and when it was
390. Walton, supra note 19, at 567.
391. Cuba, supra note 1, at 465.
392. Laura McFarland-Taylor, Tracking Stolen Artworks on the Internet: A New Standard for
Due Diligence, 16 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER INFO. L. 937, 965 (1998).
393. Id. at 966-67.
394. Id. at 965.
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stolen, but in cases where a detailed report for an international web-
site must be created, the details surrounding the theft. This is simply
too high a burden to bear for those who lost works of art during
World War II and who are now advanced in age. Further, their heirs
are in a worse position because they were often not present or, in
some cases, not even born when these artworks were stolen.
Some suggest that sellers and buyers should be obligated to conduct
title and provenance searches.395 However, to require "that the par-
ties take it upon themselves, without a claim by an original owner, to
inquire into the title and provenance or works they already hold" 396
would place "too high of a burden on the good faith purchaser. 397
Instead, it is argued that only "a new would-be purchaser should ...
take it upon herself to conduct a duly diligent inquiry into authenticity
and provenance verification .... -398
In effect, this argument, which places the burden of conducting a
duly diligent investigation into an artwork's title on potential purchas-
ers only, allows the current possessor to quietly continue to retain title
wrongfully. Indeed, requiring both current and potential possessors of
valuable artworks to conduct due diligence investigations in order to
establish good title and right to possession is as much for the benefit
of the possessor as it is for the true owner. If current possessors have
no obligation to investigate the provenance of artworks, not only are
they left exposed to any claims that may arise, but also once a claim is
made, the burden of proving good title and right to possession rests
inequitably on the shoulders of the plaintiff. This is too high of a bur-
den to bear for either party. As a result, the duty to conduct a due
diligence investigation that establishes good title should rest with both
potential and current possessors of valuable art.
D. Federal Legislation Can Provide the Necessary Solution
As one author noted, "[Als an institution, it is Congress, not the
Judiciary, which is far better equipped to 'amass and evaluate the vast
amounts of data' bearing upon the complicated issues presented in
these cases. ' 399 Indeed, Congress has at its disposal large staffs,
budget offices, committees and subcommittees, and the power to hold
395. Walton, supra note 19, at 604.
396. Id. at 612.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Cuba, supra note 1, at 451 (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 665-
66 (1994)) (citing Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 331 n.12
(1985)).
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hearings and collect testimony on issues of legislative importance. In
this way, "Congress has both a superior institutional capacity to col-
lect the necessary evidence and the fact-finding abilities to recognize
the exceptional circumstances of cases involving Nazi-looted art. 400
Further, where a court can only decide a dispute as it effects the two
involved parties, Congress can pass legislation that applies broadly to
all citizens. 40 1 Finally, because Congress is politically accountable for
its actions, it is the more appropriate branch of government to decide
questions of public policy.402
Congress is constitutionally authorized to enact legislation that ad-
dresses problems surrounding the recovery of World War II looted
art. The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution states,
"Congress shall have the Power ... To regulate Commerce with for-
eign Nations, and among the several States .... ,,403 The Commerce
Clause vests in Congress the authority to regulate state activities as
long as the particular activity being regulated "substantially affects"
interstate or international commerce. 40 4 In this way, the art industry
is indisputedly "commerce" within the meaning of the Constitution in
that million-dollar transactions frequently result in the transportation
of art across interstate and international borders.
Some would argue that federal legislation, which commands courts
to decide cases involving Nazi-looted art in a particular manner, vio-
lates the Separation of Powers doctrine.40 5 However, it has already
been demonstrated that the Judiciary has failed to create a uniform
common law and, in so doing, has failed to adequately address the
unique problems surrounding the recovery of World War II looted art.
Consequently, the Separation of Powers argument can easily be
defeated.
The United States Congress is familiar with the problems surround-
ing claims for the recovery of art looted during World War II. On
February 12, 1998, the House Banking Committee held a hearing to
discuss what to do about the problem of World War II looted art.40 6
400. See Cuba, supra note 1, at 451.
401. Id. at 452.
402. Id.
403. U.S. CONSr. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
404. Cuba, supra note 1, at 480 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Garcia v.
San Antonio Metro Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937)).
405. Cuba, supra note 1, at 482.
406. Walton, supra note 19, at 605. Restitution of Art Objects Seized by the Nazis from Holo-
caust Victims and Insurance Claims of Certain Holocaust Victims and Their Heirs, 105th CoNo.
(1998). Most of those who testified represented museums and none of them felt that federal
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On February 13, 1998, the Holocaust Victims Redress Act was signed
into law.40 7  Sponsored by Senator Alphonse D'Amato of New
York,40 8 the purpose of the Act was "[tlo provide a measure of justice
to survivors of the Holocaust all around the world .... ",409 The Holo-
caust Victims Redress Act authorized the President to appropriate up
to $25 million for distribution to charitable organizations that assist
Holocaust survivors and authorized appropriations of $5 million for
archival and translation services to assist in the restitution of assets
that belonged to Holocaust victims. 410 Further, the Act's findings sug-
gested that the restitution efforts should focus on stolen art.411
On June 23, 1998, the United States Holocaust Assets Commission
Act was signed into law. 412 The United States Holocaust Assets Com-
mission Act created a Commission on Holocaust Assets to examine
and evaluate claims made for the recovery of art currently held in the
United States. 413 The Commission was given broad powers to investi-
gate claims by way of holding hearings, requesting information from
federal departments and agencies, examining research conducted by
private individuals and entities, and locating documents found in for-
eign governments. 41 4 The Commission was charged with the responsi-
bility of reporting their findings to the President who, in turn, made
recommendations to Congress.415
legislation was necessary. Id. Instead, the museum representatives argued for the declassifica-
tion of wartime documents and for the creation of a unified registry of stolen art. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Holocaust Victims Redress Act, Pub. L. No. 105-158, 112 Stat. 15, 16 (1998).
410. See Walton, supra note 19, at 605-606.
411. Id. at 606. The Act states that
[t]he Nazis' policy of looting art was a critical element and incentive in their campaign
of genocide against individuals of Jewish and other religious and cultural heritage and,
in this context, the Holocaust ... must be considered a fundamental aspect of the world
war unleashed on the continent ... It is the sense of the Congress that ... all govern-
ments should undertake good faith efforts to facilitate the return of private and public
property, such as works of art, to the rightful owners in cases where assets were confis-
cated from the claimant during the period of Nazi rule and there is reasonable proof
that the claimant is the rightful owner.
Holocaust Victims Redress Act, Pub. L. No. 105-158, 112 Stat. 15, 17-18 (1998).
412. Walton, supra note 19, at 606. 22 U.S.C. § 1621 (2000).
413. See Tyler, supra note 297, at 467. One author writing at the time the Holocaust Assets
Redress Act was passed noted that the solution to the problems involving World War II looted
art rested on the shoulders of the Holocaust Assets Commission because private and voluntary
efforts up to that time had been "too little too late." Id. at 470.
414. Id. at 467-68.
415. See Walton, supra note 19, at 606.
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On January 16, 2001, the Holocaust Assets Commission issued its
final report to President Clinton.416 The Commission reported that
the United States made crucial mistakes in their efforts to return
looted art to its rightful owners immediately following World War
11.417 The report explained that for logistical reasons, and in accor-
dance with international law, artworks were returned to the countries
where they had been looted.418 However, failure to adequately moni-
tor the European governments prevented the United States and the
Allied forces from ensuring that the works were returned to the indi-
vidual victims. 419 In sum, the report recommended that Congress con-
tinue working on the issue of World War II looted art by resuming
efforts to declassify and publish World War II-era documents.420
E. A Burden-Shifting Amendment to the Holocaust Victims Redress
Act is Necessary to Transform Moral Obligations into
a Legal Duty
Federal legislation that shifts the burden of proving good title and
right to possession from the true owner-claimant to the current pos-
sessor-defendant in suits for the recovery of World War II looted art is
necessary to transform society's moral obligation to survivors of the
Holocaust into a legal duty.421 The most logical form for such legisla-
tion is an amendment to the Holocaust Victims Redress Act. The
416. Ron Grossman & William Neikirk, U.S. Mishandled Nazi Loot of Holocaust, Panel Says,
CHI. TRIB., Jan. 17, 2001, §1 at 1. This report is final because the Commission's mandate was set
to expire with the change of administrations that took place on Saturday, January 20, 2001. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 16.
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. It should be noted that in February 1998, Representative Charles E. Schumer of Brook-
lyn told the House Banking Committee that he, along with Representative Nita M. Lowey,
planned to introduce legislation that would require those who acquire art to do full title searches
to ensure that the art is not stolen. See Walton, supra note 19, at 606. The Stolen Artwork
Restitution Act was introduced on June 25, 1998. Stolen Artwork Restitution Act, H.R. 4138,
105th Cong. (1998). The Act stated,
[11f a request is made ... the seller or the purchaser of artwork with a sales price of
$5,000 or more, that at any time has been shipped in interstate or foreign commerce,
shall before the sale undertake a documented, reasonable inquiry into the ownership
history of the artwork . .. An individual may request an inquiry ... if the individual
produces sufficient evidence ... that the artwork for which the individual requests an
inquiry was stolen from the individual or from a member of the individual's family.
Stolen Artwork Restitution Act, H.R. 4138, 105th Cong. § 3 (1998). The Act also stated that
[iut is the sense of the Congress that a purchaser or seller of artwork who fails to under-
take an inquiry ... should not be permitted to assert in a court in the United States a
claim, under Federal, State, or otherwise applicable law, to ownership or former owner-
ship of the artwork.
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Act's stated purpose is "[t]o provide a measure of justice to survivors
of the Holocaust all around the world while they are still alive." 422
The Act also recognizes "the enormous administrative difficulties and
cost involved in proving legal ownership of ... assets" and states that
"good conscience warrants the recognition that the victims of the Hol-
ocaust have a compelling moral claim to ... unrestituted ... assets. '423
Finally, the Act states that
[i]t is the sense of Congress that all ... governments should under-
take good faith efforts to facilitate the return of ... works of art, to
the rightful owners in cases where assets were confiscated from the
claimants during the period of Nazi rule and there is reasonable
proof that the claimant is the rightful owner.424
By requiring only "reasonable proof" on the part of the claimant, the
Holocaust Victims Redress Act leaves open the door to legislation
that places a higher burden of proof on the current possessor.
As one author noted, "[T]he current legal landscape makes these
cases neither predictable nor just, and fails to protect the rights of
Holocaust victims and their heirs seeking recovery of what is rightfully
theirs. '425 Consequently, federal legislation that applies broadly to all
citizens is necessary. Once the true owner-claimant has met the first
two burdens, first, by locating the stolen work, and second, by bring-
ing a suit to recover it,426 the legislation should shift the burden of
proving good title and right to possession to the current possessor-
defendant. If the defendant fails to meet the burden, the artwork
should be returned to the claimant. In this way, claims for the recov-
ery of World War II looted art could be handled in a much more equi-
table manner and society's moral obligations to Holocaust survivors
could be translated into an affirmative legal duty on the part of those
who collect valuable art.
Stolen Artwork Restitution Act, H.R. 4138, 105th Cong. § 5 (1998). The Act was referred to the
House Committee on the Judiciary on June 25, 1998, and to the Subcommittee on Crime on July
7, 1998, where it later died. H.R. 4138, 105th Cong. (1998), available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
422. Holocaust Victims Redress Act, Pub. L. No. 105-158, 112 Stat. 15, 16 (1998).
423. Id. at 15-16. The Act further found that "the Nazis extorted and looted art from individ-
uals and institutions in countries it occupied during World War II and used such booty to help
finance their war of aggression." Id. at 17. See also supra note 411 and accompanying text.
424. Holocaust Victims Redress Act, Pub. L. No. 105-158, 112 Stat. 15, 17-18 (1998) (emphasis
added).
425. Cuba, supra note 1, at 489.
426. Based on the terms of the Holocaust Victims Redress Act, the claimant need only pro-
vide "reasonable proof" that he or she is the rightful owner when making the claim. Holocaust
Victims Redress Act, Pub. L. No. 105-158, 112 Stat. 15, 18 (1998).
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V. CONCLUSION
Because of the unique and tragic history surrounding claims for the
return of World War 1I looted art, federal legislation that commands
courts to shift the burden of proving good title and right to possession
from the true owner-claimant to the current possessor-defendant is
necessary to ensure that these unique claims are restituted. The moral
atrocity that was the Holocaust created a moral obligation that can
only be remedied by the creation of a legal duty that places the bur-
den of establishing good title on those who have the opportunity to
conduct such an inquiry. Because the courts have failed to create a
uniform common law that is capable of resolving these claims in a
predictable and equitable manner, federal legislation with broad ap-
plication is now necessary. In placing the burden of proving good title
and rightful possession on current and potential owners, society's
moral obligation to the victims of Nazi aggression can be translated
into an affirmative and equitable legal duty.
It will not be possible to track down every asset, but complete suc-
cess is not required. What is required is that everyone who had a
role in this tragedy does their best to right the wrongs that have
been committed, and that they understand that much more than
money is at stake.427
Emily J. Henson
427. Tyler, supra note 297, at 468 n.192 (quoting 144 CONG. REC. S2968-01, S2978 (daily ed.
Apr. 1, 1998) (statement of Sen. Carol Moseley-Braun)).
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